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After World War I, reallocating the former German and
Turkish colonies proved to be one of the more challenging
feats of the peace process. After months of negotiation in
1919, first in Paris, then in London, the various national
leaders agreed to create the mandate system, which proved
to be a compromise between outright colonial expansion and
genuine independence, whereby the former German and Turkish
colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were mandated
to the conquering nations in trust until the indigenous
peoples were deemed ready to administer their own
governments and societies. For decades, the mandate system
was viewed by scholars as a genuine departure from the
traditional forms of European colonialism so prevalent in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
This study departs from previous interpretations while
accounting for the key contributions from past scholars,

providing both new direction and new conclusions. The
analysis is largely philosophical in nature, tracing the
primary American role in developing the mandates, while
examining the developmental ideas behind Wilsonian
principles such as national self-determination. Moreover,
though Wilson himself is crucial to the study, the
historical lens is primarily Edward M. House, who was
Wilson’s most trusted advisor, with a particular aptitude
in the realm of foreign affairs. House was instrumental in
forming the mandate system from 1917 through 1919.
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1
INTRODUCTION
President Woodrow Wilson announced his vision of world
peace before Congress on January 8, 1918. In his famous
Fourteen Points address, Wilson outlined a non-punitive
postwar peace settlement devoted to free trade, national
self-determination, ending colonialism, and of course a
“general association of nations” to promote “political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small
states alike.”1 At war’s end, Wilson embarked on his crusade
for a better future, confident that Americans and their
European Allies could fashion a meaningful, long-lasting
peace. Yet as the Paris Peace Conference began in January
1919, the question of whether or not Wilson’s progressive
philosophy and optimistic rhetoric could withstand the
staunch realities of peacemaking remained unclear. As many
in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East surveyed the chaotic
postwar landscape, they were not easily convinced by
notions of peace, harmony, and progress. Certainly this was
true of Europe’s victorious political leaders, who were not
eager to embrace Wilson’s “enlightened” geopolitics.
Instead, they sought vengeance and compensation for the
1

Arthur S. Link et al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 68 Vols.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966-1994), 45: 529. Hereafter
cited as PWW.
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war. Hence, ultimately, securing his vision of progress
would prove to be far more complicated than Wilson
anticipated.
Reallocating the former colonies of the German and
Ottoman empires was one of the more challenging feats of
the peace process because the European victors—namely Great
Britain, France, and Italy—and Japan sought to openly
expand their colonial empires in 1919. Securing a new
vision for the colonial world, a progressive American
vision, was one of the primary objectives of Wilson’s peace
initiatives. He was aided in this process by several
individuals, Secretary of State Robert Lansing and noted
historian George Louis Beer among them. However, no one was
more important than the president’s close friend and
advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, who was instrumental in
forming and implementing U.S. colonial policy from 1917 to
1919.
Wilson and House based their postwar colonial vision
on the principle of national self-determination, which was,
in truth, steeped in ethno-cultural bias as well as geopolitical self-interest. A crucial impulse urged that the
newly-articulated League of Nations be responsible for
overseeing any new or revised colonial structure. After

3
months of negotiation in 1919, first in Paris, then in
London, the various national leaders agreed to create the
mandate system, which proved to be a compromise between
outright colonial expansion and genuine independence,
whereby the former German and Ottoman territories in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were mandated to the
conquering nations in trust until the indigenous peoples
were deemed ready to administer their own governments and
societies.
Since the mandate system’s origins are the subject of
this study, it is necessary to place my research within a
historiographic context. Contemporaries of Wilson and
House, such as Robert Lansing, David Lloyd George, Lord
Robert Cecil, and Georges Clemenceau, each published
memoirs in the years following the peace conference. These
were largely self-serving in nature, and the mandates were
minor subjects mentioned in passing, mostly as war trophies
in the cases of Lloyd George and Clemenceau.2 Even George
Louis Beer, a highly valued contributor to American
colonial policy, wrote a rather self-important account of

2

Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1921); David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties 2 vols.
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1938); Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1941); Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and
Misery of Victory (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930).
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the formative work in 1919, titled, African Questions at
the Paris Peace Conference, published in 1923. In it, he
better demonstrated his acumen for pre-World War I colonial
history than a true understanding or critique of Wilsonian
progressivism applied to the colonial world.3
In the decades between the world wars, scholarship on
the mandates was rather technical in nature, surveying the
intricate applications of the mandate system and attempting
to gauge the future political horizon of the territories
under supervision. A monumental study in this regard was
undoubtedly Quincy Wright’s treatise, Mandates Under the
League of Nations, published in 1930. It remains a
benchmark study of the legalities and procedural challenges
involved with implementing the mandates under League
supervision. However, while Wright touched on the
historical origins of the mandates, he offered virtually no
analysis of the guiding philosophies or the negotiation
processes of 1919.4 Other pioneering scholars of the
mandates, such as Paul Birdsall and Pitman Potter, wrote
sound narrative accounts of the 1919 negotiations, yet
offered limited analysis of the founding principles or the
3

George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923).
4
Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1930).
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scheming politicians behind them. The few criticisms
offered were directed at the British and French for
undermining the full power of Wilson’s idealistic
principles intended for the colonies.5
For decades, the mandate system was viewed by scholars
as a genuine departure from the traditional forms of
European colonialism so prevalent in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Not until after World War Two did a
growing number of historians seriously evaluate the
philosophical roots of the mandate system and then offer
critical perspectives of its application in Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East. In his groundbreaking book on the
British Empire, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies,
published in 1967, historian William Roger Louis astutely
argued that British (and French) imperial interests at the
Paris Peace Conference destroyed what might have been a
genuine chance for colonial freedom and independence. His
scathing account of British imperialism contrasted with a
rather benign evaluation of American complicity in
perpetuating imperialism through the Mandate System. Here
Louis proffered the notion of Wilson the naïve idealist,
5

Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York: Reynal and
Hitchcock, 1941); Pitman Potter, “Origin of the System of Mandates
under the League of Nations.” American Political Science Review 16
(January-March, 1966): 1-38.
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whose progressive vision for the colonies was stymied by
resolute imperialists such as Clemenceau and Lloyd George.6
Contemporaries of William Roger Louis, such as Hessel
Duncan Hall and Gaddis Smith, offered similar evaluations
in the 1960s and 1970s.7
The idea has persisted among many historians that a
well-intentioned Woodrow Wilson encountered staunch
opposition to his idealistic proposals in Paris, and was
therefore forced to compromise his principles in favor of
securing a fragmented allotment of his progressive vision.8
In the last few decades, the mandates have been tied to
this specific discussion, if they are even mentioned at
all. Several recent studies bear this out, such as Margaret

6

William Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
7
Hessel Duncan Hall, “The British Commonwealth and the Founding of the
League Mandate System,” Studies in International History, ed. K. Bourne
and D.C. Watt (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1967); Gaddis Smith, “The
British Government and the Disposition of the German Colonies in
Africa, 1914-1919.” In Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry
and Colonial Rule, Edited by William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967).
8
Thomas A. Bailey: Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1945) and Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New
York: Quadrangle Books, 1963). More recent historians have typically
been less adamant about Wilson’s failed idealism, but continue to offer
rather traditional evaluations anyway. The following are good examples:
Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a
New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Arthur
Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986); John Milton
Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983) and
Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the
League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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MacMillan’s prize-winning 2001 book, Paris, 1919: Six
Months That Changed the World. In it she includes a brief
chapter on the mandates, which correctly defines the
mandate system as a form of veiled imperialism. Yet she,
too, characterizes Wilson as the frustrated idealist,
unable to secure his progressive colonial vision due to
opposition from old-guard colonials in his midst. According
to MacMillan, then, Wilson’s idealism should be taken
literally.9 In 2007, Erez Manela took this idea a step
further in his study, The Wilsonian Moment, claiming that
various revolutionary movements in Egypt, India, China, and
Korea throughout 1919 could trace their inspirational roots
to Wilsonian idealism but were disillusioned by “the
failure of liberal anti-colonialism.”10 Most recently, in
Ross Kennedy's 2011 edited volume, A Companion to Woodrow
Wilson, historian Priscilla Roberts’ brief assessment of
the mandates again offers the interpretation that Wilsonian
progressivism failed on the colonial issue, not because
Wilson’s vision was particularly flawed or unsound, but
rather because he and the American delegates simply failed

9

Margaret MacMillan, Paris, 1919: Six Months That Changed the World
(New York: Random House, 2001).
10
Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the
International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
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to contend against the rampant imperial desires of their
European counterparts.11
This study departs from the intensely technical pieces
on the form and function of the mandates as well as these
previous interpretations by historians. While accounting
for the key contributions from past scholars, the research
provides both new direction and new conclusions.
Significantly, the analysis is largely philosophical in
nature, tracing the primary American role in developing the
mandates, while examining the developmental ideas behind
Wilsonian principles such as national self-determination.
Moreover, though Wilson himself is crucial to the study,
the historical lens is primarily on Edward M. House, who
was Wilson’s most trusted advisor, with a particular
aptitude in the realm of foreign affairs.
House was instrumental in forming the mandate system
from 1917 through 1919. Yet his role in this process has
been misrepresented or ignored completely. For example, in
her seminal 1973 book, Colonel House in Paris: A Study of
American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, Inga Floto
blamed House for undermining American peace initiatives,
11

Priscilla Roberts, “Wilson, Europe's Colonial Empires, and the Issue
of Imperialism,” in Ross Kennedy, ed., A Companion to Woodrow Wilson
(Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
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claiming he went around Wilson to secure his own vision for
the peace. Moreover, Floto chose to focus solely on House’s
roles in Paris, though he was vitally important during
colonial negotiations in London during the summer of 1919.12
More recently, in his 2006 biography, Woodrow Wilson’s
Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House, British
scholar Godfrey Hodgson adequately covers certain elements
of the Paris Peace Conference but neglects to mention a
number of crucial roles fulfilled by House, among them his
direction of American colonial policy. A worse oversight is
Hodgson’s claim that House spent July and August of 1919
vacationing, when, in fact, he was leading the U.S.
delegation at the Mandates Commission in London.13
Most historians writing on the mandate system’s
origins believe the American delegates were forced into
numerous compromises by Britain’s David Lloyd George,
France’s Georges Clemenceau, and leaders from the British
Dominions such as South Africa’s Jan Smuts. Yet, by framing
Edward House and Woodrow Wilson as idealists, naïvely
determined to recast the globe and create a new world
order, such interpretations inherently abide by their own
12

Inga Floto, Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American Policy at the
Paris Peace Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
13
Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel
Edward M. House (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
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definitions of the Wilsonian approach to colonial progress.
Within such interpretive frameworks, President Wilson’s
stated interests for national self-determination, economic
globalization, and collective security are often portrayed
as indicators of failure, largely because a varied form of
colonial imperialism continued and the supposed Wilsonian
vision did not come to fruition. A notable exception to
this historiographic consensus is Andrew Zimmermann’s
Alabama in Africa, which focuses on Togo in a transnational
framework that features the New South of the United States
and the colonialism of the German Empire. In this study, he
emphasizes the consensus among American and European
leaders and the continuity from German imperialism to the
League of Nations.14
However, grappling with Wilson’s and House’s own
perceptions of the world seems more apropos when attempting
to understand the myriad complexities of the negotiations.
In truth, despite the concessions made by Wilson and House
at the Paris Peace Conference, the creation of the mandate
system should be viewed as a significant achievement for
Wilsonian progressivism as they understood it. Yet,
14

Andrew Zimmermann, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the
German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010).
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paradoxically, both Wilson and House were unrealistic in
their assessment of European colonialism. They projected
their own American concepts of liberty, social justice, and
morality onto the international stage, hoping to facilitate
broad social and political reform.
The Wilsonian legacy remains at the center of world
affairs. Accordingly, this study of the mandate system
deals with concepts that still shape the international
debate over the ongoing global war on terrorism. How the
British or the Americans, in 1919 or 2013, should attempt
to stabilize the Middle East is but one example of the
contemporary relevance of my research.
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CHAPTER 1
THE WAR’S END AND EMERGING COLONIAL QUESTIONS, 1917 - 1918
Resolving colonial questions eventually became a
crucial topic of consideration in the build-up to the peace
after World War I. However, in April 1917, when the United
States formally entered the Great War, the future status of
colonies around the world garnered relatively little
attention from European and American governments. They and
their citizens were far more concerned with the immediate
strategic realities of the conflict that had been raging
for nearly three years, a conflict for which there appeared
to be no end in sight.
THE FINAL PHASES OF WAR
In February 1917, after nearly a two-year hiatus,
Germany had re-initiated its unrestricted submarine
warfare, hoping at long last to strangle the supply lines
of Britain and France. As was the case in 1915, Germany’s
decision to order its U-boats to engage targets without
warning was problematic at best. Predictably, several
vessels from neutral countries were torpedoed by German Uboats, injuring or killing passengers and crew members. The
outraged responses were swift; and American entry in April

13
was, at least in part, attributed to Germany’s resumption
of unrestricted U-boat warfare.1
Stalemate still reigned along the three European
fronts by the spring of 1917. In the East, the remnants of
Russia’s once-proud army that had not deserted gamely
fought on. They did so despite their likely confusion over
the onset in March of a revolution that would ultimately
topple the Romanov dynasty and elevate to power Vladimir I.
Lenin’s Bolsheviks. Then, in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty
signed eleven months later, in March 1918, the Bolsheviks
agreed to a separate peace with Germany, removing Russia
from the war in the midst of Germany’s resurgent offensives
on the western front.2
In April 1917, however, such eventualities were
unknown, still in the future. Instead, all combatants were
concentrating on strategic and tactical operations for
their late spring offensives. No government of the Allied
or Central Powers could have predicted that the armistice

1

Much has been written about the U-boat campaigns by Germany and the
consequences of the “unrestricted warfare” policy. The following
studies are especially helpful: Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The
Lusitania Disaster (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Diana Preston,
Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy (New York: Walker & Company, 2002).
2
Morgan Philips Price, My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1921), 147; John M. Thompson, Russia,
Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966), 3-4; Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra (New York:
Atheneum, 1987), 458.
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would occur in eighteen months, ending the fighting and
signaling the demise of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and
Ottoman empires. Instead, during this penultimate spring of
combat, the opposing armies still fought in the hopes of
achieving the decisive battlefield victories that had
eluded them, victories they hoped would end the war.
After arriving in France, American “doughboys" fought
well. In 1918, they were instrumental in throwing back the
German offensives in places like Cantigny, Chateau-Thierry,
and Belleau Wood. In concert with allied units, their
combat service then culminated in the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive, which brought fighting to a close.3
Of course, when the armistice finally occurred in
November 1918, and the guns fell silent, the belligerent
governments and their people began to survey the damage. In
truth, much of the world, but especially Europe, was in
shock from the trauma of the Great War, numbed by the
realities of the experience. For a time, many were simply
grateful it was all over. But as reality set in, the
consequences began to unfurl, weighing heavily on postwar
Europe and America. While some welcomed home long-absent
3

R. H. Lutz, ed., The Fall of the German Empire (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1932), 478; Robert H. Ferrell, America’s Deadliest
Battle (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2007), xi.
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fathers, sons, husbands, and brothers, others mourned the
loved and lost. Compared to Europe, America had barely
bloodied its nose in the war, with casualties totaling
323,018 dead and wounded U.S. servicemen. While a shocking
figure, European losses were far worse and much of the
continent was in shambles. All told, approximately 8.5
million combatants were dead and more than 21 million
wounded. Moreover, an additional 18-20 million people would
die globally from influenza by 1920.4
THE STAKES OF WAR AND PEACE
Understandably, many began to ask for an accounting at
war’s end. The questions seemed to anticipate the
nihilistic responses that would later come. What had it all
been for? What had the nations fought to preserve? Was
Western Civilization even worth preserving?
In line with their wartime propaganda campaigns,
French and British officials responded by publicly claiming
that the war had been forced upon them by German militarism
and the Huns’ feverish pursuit of wanton destruction.5
They played the part of innocent, peace-loving nations that
had been forced to defend themselves against barbarism.
4

See http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html
Accessed January 9, 2013.
5
J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British People (London: Macmillan,
1986), especially chapters 3 and 4.
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Predictably, they alleged that Germany was the nation
solely responsible for causing and perpetuating the war.6
Given the shared realities of European imperialism and
the arms race augmenting regional tensions prior to 1914,
such claims were largely self-serving. The rhetoric
capitalized upon anti-German sentiments in both Britain and
France in 1918. In essence, Allied claims of German war
responsibility overlooked the reality of a shared European
catastrophe and justified thinly veiled attempts to
rationalize punishing Germany while validating British and
French wartime policies. Not surprisingly, the demoralized,
heartbroken populations of France and Britain largely
agreed with the sentiments expressed by their respective
government leaders and journalists. Someone had to pay. Why
not the Germans?
For its part, Germany was in social and political
revolution when the armistice was signed in November 1918.
Much like their British, French, and Russian adversaries,
most Germans, civilians and soldiers alike, had favored
going to war in 1914. At the time, many had believed in the
pro-war rhetoric, possessing a keen, though flawed sense of
6

Winter, The Great War and the British People, chapter 4 See also
George Creel, The War, the World, and Wilson (New York: Harper, 1920),
122.
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national unity and purpose, namely a commitment to serve
and support Kaiser Wilhelm II and the cause of German
nationalism.7 Of course, as with new and eager soldiers
throughout history, most of Germany’s young volunteers
possessed strikingly romantic views of war in the summer of
1914. They viewed it as a great adventure, an opportunity
to distinguish themselves in battle and then return home in
glory as national heroes. Relatively few anticipated the
realities of modern warfare that would assault their bodies
and minds.
Four years later, Germany’s national consciousness had
undergone a dramatic transformation. Nearly 2 million
Germans were either killed or missing and presumed dead.
More than 4 million had been wounded.8 These once-proud
German soldiers were, of course, considered the “lucky
ones.” They returned home in defeat, physically and
psychologically traumatized by their combat experiences on
land and sea and in the air. The scope of the tragedy, the
sheer futility of fighting for a failed cause and losing an
entire generation in the process gripped many at war’s end.

7

Ronald Stromberg, Redemption by War (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1970); Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (New York: Knopf,
1975).
8
See http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html
Accessed January 10, 2013.
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However, unlike Britain, France, and the United States, who
could at least claim victory, Germany faced coming to terms
not only with the tragic war losses they had incurred, but
also with the shame of losing the conflict. Not a few
Germans spiraled downward into nihilism, seeking answers to
important questions: Who was to blame for the defeat? What
would become of the German government, its economy, and its
people?9 The answers would not be immediately forthcoming
and they would not be well received by Germans when they
did arrive.
Given such a cultural context, it is not overly
surprising that the ensuing chaos erupted throughout the
country. The Kaiser abdicated the throne on November 9,
1918, departing in shame. The German Empire of nearly fifty
years was no more.10 In its place a German Social Democratic
politician named Philipp Scheidemann arbitrarily declared a
republic into existence, without any real authority to do
so. Several rival political factions were vying for power
at the same time. While the new German government

9

Martin Gilbert, The First World War (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 369;
Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle (New York: Penguin, 1983), 146,
306; Rudolph Binding, A Fatalist at War, trans. by I. Morrow (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1929), 234-7.
10
Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, 146-54; Lutz, ed., The Fall of the
German Empire, 478-79; Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr,
Prophet, Spy (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 33-35.
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eventually consolidated its authority by 1919 as the Weimar
Republic, establishing an ostensibly democratic system, its
leadership remained problematic throughout the 1920s,
lacking true consensus and ensuring that the German people
remained divided and confused.11
And then there was the United States. By November
1918, President Woodrow Wilson was well known to most
Europeans as the intellectual, idealistic American leader.
Few understood the deeper, complex forces that motivated a
man like Wilson. In keeping with widespread American
isolationism during the previous election of 1916, one of
Wilson’s key campaign slogans simply stated: “He kept us
out of war.” Such idealistic rhetoric was, of course,
misleading. In truth, Wilson’s foreign intervention record
indicated otherwise, as in the case of America’s campaigns
against the notorious Francisco “Pancho” Villa in Mexico.
Nonetheless, Wilson deftly sidestepped such realities and
capitalized politically by claiming to loathe war as a
general principle of conflict resolution. However, going
before the U.S. Congress on April 2, 1917, and seeking a

11

Metaxas, Bonhoeffer, 34-35; C. B. Burdick and R. H. Lutz, eds., The
Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 1918-1919 (New York:
Praeger, 1966), 70-1; A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918: A
Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), 208.

20
U.S. declaration of war against Germany, the president
neatly accounted for the swinging cultural pendulum that
increasingly favored war. Ever the politician, his rhetoric
was fashioned around a new mission, a deceptively noble
sounding mission: America would fight to end the war
because, in his words, “the world must be made safe for
democracy.”12
The following January, Wilson articulated his famous
vision for the future in his Fourteen Points speech before
Congress. In it, Wilson identified a desire for a generous,
non-punitive postwar peace settlement. The key points
proclaimed the need for an “open” world at war’s end, which
would include “open covenants” as well as freedom of the
seas, equal trade rights, arms reductions, calls for selfdetermination for nations in Europe, and even the abolition
of colonialism. And in case anyone doubted the president’s
ability to make this utopian scheme a reality, he saved the
best for last. Point fourteen advocated the creation of “a
general association of nations” to bring about “political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small
states alike.”13 Ostensibly, Wilson’s League of Nations, as
12
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it became known, would help to oversee the establishment of
a new, enlightened order in the postwar world.
As the next chapter of this study will demonstrate in
more detail, Wilson’s rhetorical expression of these
idealistic, even romantic sentiments often belied his
genuine strains of thought in politics and international
affairs. Thus, when applied to broad philosophical
concepts, such as national self-determination, the unique
strains of Wilsonian progressivism were far more complex
(and disturbing) than many contemporaries or future
scholars realized. For instance, Wilson’s integration of
Christian ethics and public policy appeared admirable. Yet
his seeming commitment to virtuous, progressive policies
was often marred by a deeply-ingrained racism, a belief in
Anglo-Saxon superiority, applications of Social Darwinsim,
and a sense of American Exceptionalism.
However, these complexities of the Wilsonian mind
would not have been evident to the casual observer.
Instead, most who heard or read Wilson in 1917 and 1918
viewed the president strictly through the lens of
progressive politics. As such, he was widely perceived as
an American idealist, and his rhetoric captivated Europeans
and Americans alike who were desperately searching for
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meaning. Wilson seemed to offer a way of viewing the Great
War as a tragic, yet significant means of catharsis, an
opportunity to pursue a long-desired cultural renaissance.14
A number of questions arise. Most importantly, how
accurate were such notions? What were the crucial stakes of
the long-fought war and the subsequent peace that would be
fashioned in its wake? Altruistic speeches and articles
about honor, virtue, redemption, and accountability may
have been well received by European and American citizens
eager for some measure of validation, some profound
understanding of sacrifice. However, emotional,
manipulative rhetoric aside, the most influential guiding
principles were actually based in power politics. Within
the corridors of political power in Washington, London,
Paris, and Rome the likes of Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd
George, Georges Clémenceau, and Vittorio Orlando (and their
subordinate aides) were busy scrutinizing the geopolitical
ramifications of the war as it neared its conclusion.
Of primary importance, the balance of power,
especially in Europe, was at stake. When the war was still
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winding down in late 1918, much thought had already been
given to accruing spoils of war and visiting vengeance upon
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Redrawing the
boundaries of Europe certainly appealed to Britian, France,
and Italy to be sure. Also at stake, however, was the focus
of this study, the colonial possessions of each European
power. While colonial issues may have been secondary to the
European (or continental) balance of power, the colonies
were still profoundly important to all sides. As such,
differing perspectives on the future of colonialism—such as
outright annexation, trusteeship, or independence—garnered
much attention.15
IMPERIAL RATIONALES AND COLONIAL SYSTEMS
In order to provide context for the key colonial
questions that rose to the forefront by 1918, a brief
historical retrospective is in order regarding the
narcissistic impulses that prompted colonialism as well as
a basic overview of the colonial systems themselves. While
administration varied among the colonial powers, at least
15
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in precise methodology, the philosophical rationales were
nearly universal for European colonialism in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Europe’s colonial impulses were
steeped in the age-old principles of imperialism: wealth,
power, and prestige. Ethnocentric ideology and the insular
logic of self-interest combined to foster the European
desire to possess colonies.
Imperialism dates at least as far back as the ancient
realms of the Persians, Greeks, and Romans, to name a few.
Since nearly all imperial kingdoms and nation-states
throughout history have equated accumulating valuable
resources and commodities to the creation and maintenance
of empire, twentieth-century Europeans were certainly not
inventing the colonial wheel, so to speak. Accumulating
power and wealth remained a key principle. Of course in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mercantilism had
reigned as the key economic philosophy on which the
expanding global empires of Europe were based. Founded on
the notion that global resources were finite, mercantilism
prompted nations to compete with one another, applying all
available means to secure territories and resources for
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their own prosperity.16 Adam Smith’s 1776 publication, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, famously contended against mercantilism, favoring
the broad acceptance and application of free market
economic principles.17 By 1900, however, Europe’s imperial
philosophies and methodologies were based upon contemporary
geopolitical realities and economic principles. In
practice, variants of mercantile philosophy remained alive
and well when war erupted in 1914, entrenched at the very
heart of Europe’s ongoing imperial competitions.
Accumulating resources as the engines of imperial
wealth and power may have been crucial, but equally
influential were the notions of honor and prestige attached
to colonial possessions. By the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, Europeans viewed their colonial
empires as synonymous with national greatness, the laws of
competition, and even with the idea of cultural fitness. A
popular belief held that colonies were positive reflections
of the mother country, capable of enhancing a nation’s
16

Writing on the topic of mercantilism is voluminous. The following
works are extremely helpful: David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus:
Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from
1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John
Kenneth Galbraith, Economics in Perspective: A Critical History
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987).
17
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations: A Selected Edition. Edited by Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).

26
unique character, certainly, but also of promoting the
inherent glories of Western Civilization more broadly. Not
surprisingly, maps of colonial holdings in Africa and Asia
were embraced as powerful symbols of wealth and prestige,
even of a nation’s future destiny.18
Economic philosophies and prideful, ethnocentric
associations between civilization and colonization
furnished rationales to support the subjugation of
indigenous peoples around the world. The argument that
Western technological advancement equaled inherent cultural
progress convinced many, especially when Rudyard Kipling’s
ideas of “The White Man’s Burden” were combined with the
Darwinian notion that all of humankind was engaged in an
evolutionary struggle in which only the fittest would
survive. The Social Darwinist logic of Herbert Spencer and
others seemed inescapable. Great cultures should expand and
possess vast empires to the “benefit” of “lesser” cultures.
The natives had to be “civilized” and the various raw
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materials then applied in service to the home country.19
Ultimately, when combined with their inherent belief
in both racial and cultural superiority, it was not a huge
philosophical leap for Europeans to rationalize colonialism
as both economically prudent and culturally progressive.
Throughout Africa, Asia, and portions of the Middle East,
explorers, adventurers, and missionaries gave way to
traders, government administrators, and soldiers. These
empires were, in many ways, products of the industrial
revolution and of Europe’s advantage in technical
innovation, especially in weaponry. By the late-nineteenth
century, a complex network of ports, trading centers,
railroads, plantations and mines covered the African
continent as well as parts of the Asian mainland and island
territories.20
The consequences were many, and they were tragic for
native populations living under colonial rule. European
administrators established themselves as the ruling class,
overseeing the formation and conduct of colonial policy.
19
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They became the social and political elite. Conversely, the
native populations were relegated to stratified service
castes in most colonial settlements. Those from culturally
elite families were, conceivably, allowed to work in useful
social or political jobs, but always in service to the
Europeans in charge. The remaining members of native
populations found themselves in a vast assortment of jobs
in service to their respective colonial overseers:
mineworkers, ranch hands, laborers on rubber plantations,
shipyard workers, and the like.
The technical application of colonial policies varied
among the British, French, Germans, Belgians, and others.
In other words, while colonialism was universally harmful
to the indigenous populations, certain colonial governments
pursued measures of peaceful co-existence more effectively
than others. By and large those living in places like
British Malaya experienced far better conditions than those
living under the brutally harsh realities of Belgian rule
in King Leopold’s so-called “Congo Free State.”
Nonetheless, the inescapable truth is that indigenous
peoples around the world had their kingdoms and countries,
their very ways of life stolen from them by Europeans. They
subsequently found themselves living in their own native
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lands in subservient roles. Such were the atrocious
realities of colonialism.21
EMERGING QUESTIONS AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
When war broke out in 1914, Europe and its combined
imperial territories consisted of approximately 15,000,000
square miles, nearly 85 percent of the globe’s land
surfaces. During the war, Germany surrendered its colonies
in Cameroon, Togoland, and Southwest Africa after several
brutal military campaigns in those territories. At the time
of the armistice, Germany still retained its colony in East
Africa, though the odds of permanent possession were
unlikely at that juncture. Turkish holdings in the Middle
East—namely those in Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and
Iraq—also became vital topics of debate. Hence, at war’s
end, the victorious powers—namely Britain, France, Italy,
Japan, Belgium and to a lesser degree the United States—had
to decide the fates of their own colonial holdings as well
as those of the former German and Ottoman empires,
respectively.22
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Map 1.1
Colonial Africa, 1914
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Map 1.2
Pacific Island Colonies, 1914
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Map 1.3
Colonial Middle East, 1914
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These decisions would be complicated, to be sure.
Important questions included the following: should the
victorious colonial powers maintain their own colonial
possessions? Should they additionally consider dividing the
colonial spoils by annexing the former German and Turkish
colonies? Conversely, given the idealistic surge of
rhetoric emanating from the likes of Woodrow Wilson,
members of the Arab revolt, and other indigenous groups,
should all colonies be granted independence? Or, lastly,
should some gain independence while others remained within
the colonial structure?
Given the sharp divisions between pro-colonial voices
in Europe and the British dominions versus those advocating
the end of colonialism, resolving the colonial questions
seemed like a mountain peak too difficult to climb in
November 1918. Perhaps predictably, some of the precedents
relied upon to inform their decisions moving forward—namely
the Berlin Act of 1885, the Brussels Act of 1892, and the
Algeciras Convention of 1906—had each been utilized by
European powers to ostensibly legalize their ambitious
scrambling for colonial gains in the first place.23 Other
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proposals in 1918, including those by Woodrow Wilson and
South Africa’s Jan Smuts, at first blush appeared to be
comparatively enlightened reformations of traditional
colonial structures.24 But how may we measure the rhetoric
in these proposals? What were the key intellectual
foundations informing Wilsonian progressivism in
particular? Those questions will be the focal points of the
next chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Wilsonian Mind and a Progressive World Order
Over the years, many historical critiques of Wilsonian
statecraft have characterized U.S. postwar initiatives in
1918-1919 as overly idealistic, prone to naïve perceptions
of geopolitical power structures and vulnerable to the
devious machinations of Europe’s more realistic and
seasoned politicians, such as Britain’s David Lloyd George
and his French counterpart, Georges Clemenceau. According
to such traditional narratives, Woodrow Wilson, Edward M.
House, and their American aides succumbed to immense
pressure and were forced to abandon their idealistic
principles at the Paris Peace Conference in the face of
wily, cynical opposition from the British, French, and
Italian delegations.1 Ostensibly, the compromises involved
issues ranging from Europe’s border restructuring and
1
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economic reparations to the focus of this study, the
principle of national self-determination in the colonial
world. American history survey texts are actually fairly
decent barometers for measuring the consensus views among
historians on a variety of topics. Regarding Woodrow
Wilson’s vision for postwar peace, many popular college
survey texts in the United States continue to present
students with some variant of the narrative about America’s
“failure” to secure its idealistic promises in 1919.2
FLAWED INTERPRETIVE ASSUMPTIONS
However, such interpretations are based upon flawed
notions of the colonial objectives that Wilson and House
ultimately pursued in Paris (and subsequently London) in
1919. Analytical shortcomings are prominent in these
studies. Assumptions of failure stem from false premises,
which invariably produce unsound conclusions regarding
American peace initiatives for the postwar colonial world.
The claims of American failure are specifically based upon
the fact that the lion’s share of former German and Turkish
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colonies did not achieve outright independence as a result
of the League of Nations Covenant.3
Wilsonian progressive philosophy has often been
perceived as being inherently opposed to traditional
European imperial philosophy as well as the resulting
colonial systems. Equating Wilsonian rhetoric on principles
of national self-determination with their own notions of
progressive history, Wilson’s near-contemporaries as well
as future scholars often assumed that the Wilsonian vision
was inherently idealistic, entailing the literal, universal
pursuit of equality and independence for indigenous peoples
under Europe’s colonial rule.4 Since no such vision of
progress came to fruition after the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, frequent conclusions have revolved around the idea
that Wilsonian progressivism was flawed, perhaps inherently
naïve and unachievable.5 The logic seems soothingly
inescapable. By ascribing American failure to “compromise”
and “acquiescence,” traditional interpretations have often
3
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turned Wilson and House into simplistic caricatures,
political idealists whose supposed naiveté proved
detrimental when facing savvy political realists, primarily
within the British and French delegations.
The truth of the matter is that the eventual colonial
settlement was ultimately far more in line with Wilsonian
progressivism than many believe. Accurately comprehending
the American colonial initiatives engaged by President
Woodrow Wilson and Edward M. House requires a sound
understanding of the Wilsonian mind, particularly of the
philosophical roots and personal experiences that served as
the foundations for the Wilsonian brand of progressivism
endorsed by these two men.
To begin measuring Wilsonian perspectives on
progressive global relations, understanding his
intellectual foundations is essential. What are these? As
historian Lloyd Ambrosius indicates in Wilsonian
Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism
during World War I, Wilson’s “progressive philosophy of
history provided the important intellectual foundations for
his liberal internationalism.”

Ambrosius goes on to

characterize Wilson’s perspectives in this manner:
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The president’s understanding of progressive history
embraced the Social Gospel in American Christianity.
He wanted to redeem the Old World from its outmoded
system of alliances that depended upon a discredited
balance of power. He sought to establish a new
community of nations that would rely instead on
collective security. Identification of U.S. foreign
policy with the progressive fulfillment of God’s will
on earth limited Wilson’s disposition to compromise.6
In essence, Woodrow Wilson was both a traditionalist and a
modernist, an old guard Christian moralist who nonetheless
believed in modern ideas such as Social Darwinism, which
conformed neatly to the germ theory, emphasizing heredity
as the prime shaper in human history. And though he
generally idealized the Anglo-Saxon heritage, believing
Western Civilization was inherently superior, Wilson was
also a genuine American exceptionalist. For him, the United
States was a uniquely blessed cultural experiment among the
enlightened nations of the world.7
Some crucial questions arise. What is the genesis of
such philosophies? Where did these prevailing concepts of
progressivism come from? And more importantly, why did
Woodrow Wilson believe them? To provide some answers, a
6
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brief overview of Wilson’s various philosophical
foundations is merited.
COMMON SENSE REALISM CHRISTIANITY
Born in Staunton, Virginia on December 28, 1856,
Thomas Woodrow Wilson was a child of the South, spending
the majority of his youth in Georgia, before moving to
South Carolina in 1870. He was raised by devout, though
intellectually-oriented Christian parents of primarily
Scottish ancestry. His father, the Rev. Joseph R. Wilson,
was a Southern Presbyterian minister whose influence on his
son was enormous. In truth, the young Woodrow Wilson
benefited immensely from the demanding, yet loving home
environment, and he would later give much credit to both
his father and mother for modeling the intellectual and
spiritual virtues that allowed him to thrive.8
A rationalist and scholarly approach, based upon the
Scottish Reformed tradition, gave depth and dimension to
Wilson’s Christianity, and remained central to his
worldview throughout his life. But what was entailed in
8
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this approach? By the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant,
evangelical Christianity in America existed within two
basic theological streams. The populist evangelical branch,
spawned by the First and Second Great Awakenings, gradually
became a widely embraced wing of the Christian faith, with
a strong revivalist style that downplayed rigid doctrine
and appealed broadly to ordinary folk rather than social
elites, seminary-trained clergymen, or intellectuals. Most
notable in the southern states, the populist orientation
originally included mostly Baptists, Methodists, and
denominational offshoots such as the Restoration Movement
(the Churches of Christ and the Disciples of Christ).9
The other theological branch was rationalist and
scholarly. Centered primarily in the North, it included
those within the Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and
Episcopalian churches. Especially within Presbyterianism,
theology and doctrine were steeped in the philosophy of
Common Sense Realism, which had been a part of the Scottish
Reformed tradition for more than a century. In essence, the
Common Sense approach argued that most nineteenth-century
9
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thinkers included among the self-evident, universal truths
many of the basic teachings of Christianity, such as God’s
existence, His goodness, and His creation of the world. In
other words, the Common Sense wing of Scottish Reformed
Christianity favored an evidential form of apologetics,
emphasizing truths knowable by believer and unbeliever
alike, which ultimately allowed individuals to evaluate
competing doctrines and worldviews on similar footing.10
Woodrow Wilson ultimately came to favor a rather
interesting combination of evangelicalism’s populist and
scholarly branches, uniting evangelical fervor with a more
traditional emphasis on theology and scholarship. Largely
due to his father’s Scottish Reformed Presbyterianism,
Wilson naturally absorbed much of the Common Sense
philosophy as a theological foundation. In this vein, he
seems to have viewed his Christianity somewhat more
holistically, as a rationalist might. For him, the precepts
of the Bible were more than just morality plays that could
be embraced or discarded according to the individual
conscience, or cast into the realm of private values.
Rather, for Wilson, the truths of scripture could be
10
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readily understood within the context of real human
experience, as logical, universal guidelines regarding how
humans were meant to think and act.11
Interestingly, however, Woodrow Wilson appears to have
combined this rational, scholarly approach to Christianity
with elements of the populist vision. Hence, while he
certainly embraced Scottish Reformed theology, the zeal of
the populist approach was also ingrained in Wilson. This is
not overly surprising considering Wilson’s formative years
were spent in the South, where populist evangelicalism was
most prominent.12
Consequences abound. Woodrow Wilson understood
Christianity as a definitive, universal worldview that
codified the nature of human life. Moreover, its precepts
could be logically connected to and measured by the
realities of the human experience. Hence, Christianity was
demonstrably true. Moreover, the emotional currents of
evangelical populism prompted the zealous Wilson to action,
lest his Christian faith be relegated solely to church
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activities.13 If, indeed, Christian precepts were
universally right and good, then might it be possible to
use these verities as rationales for meaningful public
policy, weaving them into the very fabric of American
culture, and perhaps other cultures as well? Wilson aimed
to find out.
WOODROW WILSON AND RACE
While Woodrow Wilson’s rather eclectic mixture of
Christian theology proved central to his advocacy of
progressive civilization, his notions of liberalism were
also informed by his understanding of liberty and equality,
which he measured in part through the lens of race. Hence
Wilson’s perspectives on racial equality merit a brief
overview and analysis.
As a child of the South who came of age after the
Civil War, Wilson possessed keenly-felt views on the
subject of race. The trauma of the war gave way to dramatic
shifts in race relations during the course of
Reconstruction. In the wake of the Confederacy’s collapse,
such changes were, of course, largely unwelcome in the
South, producing additional anxiety and tension over the
13
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respective roles and responsibilities of white and black
Southerners. Not surprisingly, Wilson was extremely
critical of Radical Reconstruction, believing Congressional
proponents had recklessly disposed of President Abraham
Lincoln’s moderate vision for reunification. Wilson viewed
racial equality as unnatural, and therefore determined that
Lincoln’s goal must have been to use the Thirteenth
Amendment merely to emancipate the slaves, not to provide
them with social or political equality among Whites. Wilson
thus concluded that Radical Reconstruction was a travesty,
an effort on the part of certain Northerners to destabilize
and further weaken the South through social and racial
revolution.14
In his book, A History of the American People (1902),
Wilson wrote the following: “It was a menace to society
itself that the negroes should thus of a sudden be set free
and left without tutelage or restraint.” Then, in
conspiratorial fashion, he further suggested that radical
Northerners “wished not only to give the negroes political
privilege but also to put the white men of the South
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resolutely under the negroes’ heels.”

15

Such statements

reveal not only Wilson’s belief that Radical Reconstruction
was harmful (and unconstitutional), but also his troubling
sense of what a properly maintained, mutually beneficial
social and racial hierarchy looked like in the South. For
Wilson, segregationist protocols such as the Black Codes
were positive, stabilizing social forces, allowing limited
new freedoms to former slaves, while rightly preserving
their subservient status to white southerners, who
ostensibly would serve as social mentors to newly freed
blacks. Wilson even rationalized the militant activities of
the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) as necessary for the preservation of
southern civilization, claiming the KKK was formed as
something of a public service organization, forced to “take
the law into their own hands.” Accordingly, argued Wilson,
the KKK utilized intimidation tactics only because they
were deprived of normal civil service mechanisms by the
Radical Republican agenda.16 Ultimately, then, Wilson
believed Reconstruction endangered the delicate racial
balance of power throughout the South. To be sure, he took
solace in the fact that Reconstruction was largely
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unsuccessful by 1877, allowing segregation to remain and
expand around the country. Nonetheless, Wilson’s memories
of these traumatic events directly impacted his policies in
later years.
Of course Wilson did not limit his appraisals of race
to domestic issues. In the 1880s, as a graduate student at
Johns Hopkins University, Wilson studied under Professors
Herbert Baxter Adams and Richard T. Ely, both of whom had
completed their Ph.D. degrees in Germany, at the University
of Heidelberg. Steeped in the philosophies of George
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Adams and Ely dutifully taught
their students the intricacies of German historicism,
including the so-called “germ theory.”

17
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to the strongest nations developed from the richest
cultural roots. According to German historicism, those
roots were, of course, Teutonic in nature.18
From the start, Wilson was taken with this concept,
merging Europe’s rich cultural heritage with a sense of
17
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individual and collective fitness. It was not difficult for
Wilson to trace America’s social and political lineage. He
understood the European foundations better than most.
However, he further identified the ideals of American and
European culture with another crucial factor: race. He
therefore distinguished between white European-based
civilizations—perceived as the vanguard of modern
liberalism—and those from Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East, where race and ethnicity supposedly inhibited the
pursuit of enlightened social and political virtues.19
According to Wilson’s warped logic, then, it would
seem that white people in Europe and North America rightly
possessed a monopoly on the enlightened pursuit of
democratic principles and liberal progressivism. He said as
much in 1885, while writing about the virtues of democracy.
For Wilson, the successful American political experiment
was best explained by its origins “in our history, in our
experience as a Teutonic race set apart to make a special
character.”
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Clearly, Wilson’s perceptions of inherent

white superiority informed his approach to geo-politics,
including matters of colonial policy, as will be shown.
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ANGLO-SAXONISM AND SOCIAL DARWINISM
Woodrow Wilson’s racist biases consequently affected
his understanding and application of other ethno-cultural
philosophies. Like many Americans of his generation, Wilson
was quite taken with the idea that Western Civilization,
dating at least as far back as the Greeks and Romans, was
inherently superior to the rest of the world. A rather
stark bias toward Anglo-Saxon culture was quite prominent
in the United States.21 In certain ways, this seems strange,
especially given the fact that the Angles and Saxons were
historically distinctive to Britain’s modern cultural
heritage rather than endemic to the rest of Europe and
North America. However, the term Anglo-Saxon was (and is)
often used to denote an association with Western
Civilization more broadly. This certainly seems to have
been Wilson’s typical application of the phrase.22
The idea, of course, was that Western thought and
culture was intrinsically more enlightened and advanced
than cultures elsewhere. When Eurocentric gentlemen like
21
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Wilson surveyed the seminal Western traditions—in history,
politics, philosophy, literature, poetry, music, and art,
among others—they concluded that the Western cultural
heritage was not merely impressive, but innately superior.
Of course, they were right in their desire to affirm and
preserve the virtues of Western knowledge that had been
built up over the many centuries. It is, indeed, difficult
to imagine a world without the phenomenally influential
ideas of ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, or
more modern thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Søren
Kierkegaard. What might the modern world be without the
pivotal engineering skills of the Romans or the exquisite
images painted by Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and the
like? The examples are numerous. Humanity has always been
enriched by the best of Western Civilization to be sure.
No, the philosophical flaws lay elsewhere for men,
like Wilson, who accepted Anglo-Saxon superiority as truth.
Especially insidious was the notion that the rest of the
world had much less of value to offer. In identifying
Western thought and culture as the most enlightened, the
prevailing concept became that Westerners must be the
purveyors of genuine knowledge, of truth, and of beauty. As
pioneers of “advanced, technologically superior”
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civilization, it seemed logical to conclude that the West
had the right, even the responsibility, to introduce and
foster these ostensibly superior notions to the “backward”
peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, among other
territories.23 Still, such ideologies are difficult to
rationalize and act upon without something more to go on
than philosophical hyperbole based largely on culturally
biased sentiments. There had to be something more, a sound
logic that could be used to uphold and explain Western,
Anglo-Saxon superiority. Wilson and thousands of other
Westerners found just such an explanatory gift in the ideas
of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer.
The famed British naturalist, Charles Darwin, requires
no introduction. His biological theories shook the world in
1859 with the publication of On the Origin of Species, then
again in 1871 with his more controversial work, The Descent
of Man. Essentially, Darwin theorized that minor
adaptations (sometimes called microevolution) within a
species could be extrapolated over vast periods of time to
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explain the major differences dividing taxonomic groups
(sometimes called macroevolution).24 Darwinism was
implacably naturalistic, explaining life’s origin and
development by strictly natural, random causes. Perhaps the
most crucial of these ideas was the theory of “natural
selection,” whereby nature preserves traits that promote
fitness and allow for the survival and advancement of a
species.25
As significant as Darwin’s theories were for
biologists, it was the broad application of his ideas
beyond the biological sciences that truly changed the
world, often for the worse. A number of Charles Darwin’s
Victorian contemporaries believed that “natural selection”
could be used to explain not only the basic formation of
biological organisms, but also every significant aspect of
human thought and behavior. Herbert Spencer is perhaps the
most famous of these. An English philosopher, politician,
and sociologist, Spencer was an avid Darwinist, committed
to explaining the entire human experience through a
naturalistic lens. According to Spencer, human societies
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and institutions were just like plants and animals in the
sense that they were both formed by the process of natural
selection, resulting in what he famously referred to as the
“survival of the fittest.”26
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century,
Spencer was joined by a growing number of politicians,
sociologists, and others, including William Graham Sumner
and T. H. Huxley, in advocating for the broad application
of Darwinian principles in explaining modern life,
including basic social structures. These men assumed
society was naturally evolving for the better. For cultural
advancement to occur, each individual had to compete in the
process of social evolution. Moreover, this freedom of
competition was inviolable, and any interference—from the
government or elsewhere—would conceivably be disastrous.
Social Darwinism thus embraced a laissez-faire approach to
government. Even if well-intentioned, by regulating
business, taxation, housing, or even sanitation, the
government would unwittingly be aiding the “unfit” and
hindering societal progression.27
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For Spencer, Sumner, Huxley, and a host of others,
successful business magnates and their corporations were
presumed to be the “engines” of social progress. If
smaller, entrepreneurial businesses were marginalized or
destroyed by trusts and monopolies, they had no basis for a
grievance. After all, such outcomes were viewed as natural
parts of the evolutionary process. Moreover, Spencer and
his compatriots believed that Darwinian explanations were
not only sound rationales for existing class structures,
but also liberating propositions, allowing the different
classes to recognize the nominally concrete logic of
science as an unbiased, impersonal explanation. In essence
the disenfranchised classes should simply accept their
natural place in society and live more harmoniously, at
least according to the warped logic of Spencer.28
The use of Darwinism to promote such a rugged
individualist, “every man for himself” approach to human
civilization was challenged by a precious few in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the time of
his election to the presidency in 1912, Wilson had long
been a philosophical adherent of the disturbing logic; in
fact, he was a practitioner. It seemed to be a perfect
28
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underpinning for the Anglo-Saxon elitism that many, like
Wilson and Edward House, embraced.29
An additional, equally crucial element of Wilson’s
philosophical/intellectual framework proved enormously
important during and after World War I. For while Wilson
embraced Anglo-Saxon superiority and rationalized it
through elements of Social Darwinist thought, he also
believed that the United States existed as a providential
experiment, uniquely gifted to carry out its civilizing
mission to the world. For Wilson, America was truly
exceptional.
THE IMPULSE OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
At present, in the second decade of the twenty-first
century, globalization is widely embraced and many parts of
the world are coming together despite the considerable
cultural and geographic distances. Emerging communication
technologies, shared commercial interests, and a greater
sense of geo-political interdependence typically elicit
much positive feedback from postmodern Americans. Given
this cross-cultural milieu, one might naturally assume that
an elitist, condescending, and divisive philosophy such as
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American exceptionalism would be increasingly unwelcome. Of
course, much of the world is, indeed, wary of the United
States. Yet many Americans still gravitate toward the
belief that they are part of something special, a singular
cultural and political environment that nurtures and
insulates, even as it seeks to broaden its impact through
the projection of power.30
American exceptionalism is based on two key notions:
that America possesses a unique cultural heritage and
therefore must act upon a special set of responsibilities,
including the projection of inherent virtues such as the
concepts of liberty, equality, and republican democracy.
The philosophy has deep roots in our culture, stretching
all the way back to the early colonial period. In his 1630
sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity,” John Winthrop, a
founder of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, famously outlined
his prescription for building a Puritan society that would
remain dedicated to the Christian faith despite the many
obstacles the Puritans were likely to encounter in the New
World.
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Winthrop took as his inspiration the biblical passage
from the book of Matthew known as the “Sermon on the
Mount,” in which Jesus presents the central tenets of
discipleship eventually formalized in Christianity. In
Matthew 5:14-16, speaking to the Galilean crowd as well as
his own disciples, Jesus says:
You are the light of the world. A city that is set on
a hill cannot be hidden. Nor do they light a lamp and
put it under a basket, but on a lampstand, and it
gives light to all who are in the house. Let your
light so shine before men, that they may see your good
works and glorify your Father in heaven.31
In his own sermon, Winthrop encouraged his fellow
Puritans to unify and conform to their stated doctrines,
not only for the sake of their own piety, but also because
there was a higher, yet practical calling. He characterized
the Puritans’ colonial endeavor as part of a unique
spiritual covenant with God, whereby the Massachusetts Bay
Colony would be as a “city upon a hill,” modeling unity and
Christian charity to others.32
John Winthrop’s sermons and writings were not widely
read during the seventeenth century. Thus his voice was not
a clarion call for change during his own lifetime or those
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of succeeding generations.

33

Moreover, in truth, Winthrop

should not be shackled with the burdensome chains of a
philosophy he neither invented nor advocated. He was not
the progenitor of American exceptionalism any more than
Friedrich Nietszche was the founder of Nazism. A close
reading of Winthrop’s collection of sermons and other
pieces indicates the Massachusetts Bay leader did not
envision a broad, aggressive pursuit of the “city upon a
hill,” in which other American colonies (at the time),
neighboring territories, or nations were forced to adopt
and practice Puritanism as he or his fellow colonists from
Massachusetts Bay prescribed. His was a rather more
restrained, even elegant, appeal for shared unity and
purpose in a community of like-minded people. Winthrop’s
“city upon a hill” was not intended to alter the world
through force of action against others, but rather by
consistently modeling its virtues in ways that inspired
others to do the same.34
While he likely would have been surprised by the
trend, over time John Winthrop became one of the more
revered early American colonial leaders. In the wake of the
33
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American Revolution, Winthrop’s views gained recognition
because of the presumably patriotic quality of his words.
By the mid-to-late nineteenth century, his once-obscure
sermons and social philosophies were being read and
analyzed by scores of politicians and scholars. It is not a
coincidence that the key rationales for “Manifest Destiny”
in the 1840s drew heavily from the righteous-sounding
ideological phrases found in Winthrop.35
As an American born in the mid-nineteenth century, as
one who came of age during the decades of unrivaled
industrial and economic expansion, Woodrow Wilson adopted
American exceptionalism much like his contemporaries.36 He
read Winthrop, along with many others of the same ilk. Over
time, the exceptional qualities of the American character
seemed like foregone conclusions, easily identifiable to
Wilson. After all, how else could America’s rise to
prominence be explained if not by a unique capacity for
overcoming immense obstacles in order to secure its
republican vision. Not only had Americans achieved
independence by defeating a great European power, they had
also swept across the continent from east to west, and even
35
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fought and survived a cataclysmic civil war. By the last
decade of the nineteenth century, it seemed America and its
citizens were poised for greatness.
A number of like-minded colleagues and acquaintances
shared Wilson’s assessment of the reasons for America’s
rise to prominence as well as its future destiny. Their
mutual support of one another not only inspired confidence
through discussion and debate; in Wilson’s case, such
collaborations often proved to be the genesis of future
policy. Perhaps the most important and influential was the
famous historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, with whom
Wilson struck up a friendship. Turner, of course, went on
to fame as one of the leading American historians of the
early twentieth century, first at the University of
Wisconsin (1890–1910), and then at Harvard (1911–1924). An
exceptionalist in his own right, Turner valued the
Princeton scholar’s opinion highly, and in fact asked
Wilson to read and critique early drafts of his famous
“frontier thesis,” a sprawling critique of the frontier’s
defining impact on American identity. It was an
exceptionalist vision through and through.37
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THE RESULTING WILSONIAN PROGRESSIVISM
Woodrow Wilson believed all of American history was to
be interpreted within these essential philosophical
frameworks. In conjunction with his applied understanding
of Christianity, race, Anglo-Saxonism, and Social
Darwinism, Wilson’s dedication to the idea of an
exceptional American heritage and purpose led him to
advocate and pursue a rather unique brand of progressivism,
one that often differed from his contemporaries. Typical
progressives were, like Wilson, Caucasian, middle-class
idealists, though they included both Republican and
Democratic advocates. Most were broadly concerned with
addressing the abuses of power prominent in local political
machines, while instituting practical, efficient, and
ethical government protocols. They sought to reform and
regulate politics and business in the pursuit of a variety
of social justice causes, including ending child labor,
implementing safety regulations for the American worker,
prohibiting the sale of alcohol, curtailing the corporate
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trusts, and endorsing women’s suffrage, among other
pursuits.38
Wilson the reformer and progressive seemed incongruous
with these objectives. Even seemingly like-minded
progressives often failed to understand Wilson’s approach
as president to social and political reform in America. At
times, he seemed like a run-of-the-mill progressive. For
instance, he was an anti-trust advocate and oversaw the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in the United
States. However, while embracing traditional progressivism
in many respects, Wilson was atypical in other ways during
his two terms. In pursuing his social and political vision,
the president drew heavily from his understanding of
progressive history, precisely defined by 1) Christianity,
2) race, 3) Anglo-Saxonism, 4) Social Darwinism, and 5)
American exceptionalism.39
If contemporaries had fully comprehended the impulses
that ruled Wilson, they likely would have been far less
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surprised by his domestic philosophies and programs.40
Though he targeted the trusts, rightly believing they
undermined entrepreneurial competition, his New Freedom
program was designed to ensure less federal oversight in
business, and therefore less intervention. He also opposed
many social justice programs, consistently withholding his
support for causes such as child labor reform and women’s
suffrage.41
To the twenty-first century mind, these notions seem
anything but progressive. Yet once Wilson’s underlying
philosophical foundations are understood and acknowledged,
it is possible to achieve greater objectivity in critiquing
the policies, disturbing as they may be. For starters, on
issues of race, President Wilson the progressive
consistently failed to support black Americans in their
fight for equality and upward social mobility in the early
twentieth century. Wilson the wily politician may have
promised increased measures of equality for African
Americans, but such rhetorical posturing belied his true
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feelings on the matter.42 Of course, Wilson did not consider
his own views to be contradictory. He believed in inspiring
black Americans by promising them a better future, with
greater access to social and economic privilege in America.
Ironically, however, the upward mobility sought by W.E.B.
DuBois and other black leaders required, among other
things, broad access for African Americans to the realm of
politics, local and national. Yet Wilson was unwilling to
seriously consider providing blacks with access to the
corridors of political power in the United States.43 In
essence, he and his fellow white politicians viewed
themselves as the self-appointed guardians of civic virtue.
Hence, for the president, the phrase “racial equality” was
a misnomer in most respects.
Consider Wilson’s responses to several issues of race
prior to and during his presidency. As white Americans
plowed through the southwest in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, indigenous as well as Mexicanbased cultures were virtually destroyed in favor of white,
supposedly “Christian” culture. More accurately viewed as
blatant imperialism than a true Christian mission, these
42
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episodes were largely praised by Wilson as essential to the
formation of a “unified nation and people.”44
Persecution of black Americans was endemic in the
South during Wilson’s presidency. Yet his administration
failed to acknowledge the need for even minimal safeguards
against heinous crimes such as lynchings, which were common
in many southern states. Wilson was appropriately disturbed
by these ongoing murders. Even so, he refused to sanction
direct intervention, viewing lynchings as unfortunate
byproducts of the magnified racial animosities stirred up
during Reconstruction.45
Of course, Wilson’s views on race were not limited to
domestic affairs. During and after the Spanish-American War
of 1898, then Professor Wilson was thrilled by the notion
of acquiring the Philippines as an American “protectorate.”
Here was a tailor-made opportunity for the United States.
Assuming the Filipinos both desired and needed change,
Wilson anticipated providing the “foreigners” with social,
political, and spiritual guidance, allowing the Philippines
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to eventually leave behind their “regressive” cultural
standards and join the ranks of enlightened civilizations.46
Wilson’s views on race were consistent with his belief
in Social Darwinism. In that sense, his domestic reform
agenda aligned with the notion that the federal
government’s responsibilities to the average citizen were
actually quite limited, and that federal law should
encourage the competitive realities suggested by Darwin’s
process of “natural selection” and Spencer’s “survival of
the fittest” mantra. Again, according to this thinking, by
interfering with business or supporting the “unfit,” the
government ran the risk of unwittingly destroying, or at
least inhibiting, social progress.
WILSON AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
When Wilsonian progressivism was applied to the arena
of international relations, the consequences were many.
Hence a brief contextual understanding of Wilson’s true
notions of independence is essential. When referring to the
principle of national self-determination, most modern
scholars use some variant of the following definition
supplied by Alfred Cobban, a pioneering scholar on the
46
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subject. Cobban defined national self-determination as “the
right of a nation to constitute an independent state and
determine its own government for itself.”47 Implicit in this
definition is the idea of sovereignty, the notion that each
nation state is inherently capable of formulating civil
structures and practicing self-government.
However, the crucial issue for this study is whether
Wilson understood national self-determination to be an
inherent, universal right. The answer is, unfortunately,
no. In reality, Wilson viewed the principle of national
self-determination through a very restrictive lens, based
largely upon his long-standing commitment to historicism.
As previously indicated, Wilson’s historicist views were
both traditional and progressive in nature, steeped in
Common Sense Realism Christianity, racism, Anglo-Saxonism,
and Social Darwinism. Moreover, he understood America’s
exceptional democratic strengths as historically
derivative, arising from a shared national consciousness
and experience over the course of successive generations.
In explaining this idea, Wilson suggested that “no people
can be a nation before its time, and its time has not come
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until the national thought and feeling have been developed
and have become prevalent. Until a people thinks its
government national it is not national.”48
Not surprisingly, according to Woodrow Wilson, the key
historical proving ground for Americans had been the Civil
War, which, through traumatic circumstances, unified and
ultimately strengthened the American commitment to shared
civic principles and to national government. Hence, for
Wilson, the strength of American democracy by the early
twentieth century was based upon a natural historical
progression, which he defined as a process of “organic
development” that over time produced a truly democratic
nation.49 In a startling critique coming from a southerner
in the 1880s, Wilson affirmed President Abraham Lincoln’s
handling of the Civil War, namely because Wilson believed
Lincoln rightly valued the preservation of national unity.
In his dogged pursuit of reunification, Lincoln had
therefore saved the nation and its government, affirming
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and preserving the founding virtues conveyed by Thomas
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence.50
As a politician, Wilson understood and applied the
principle of national self-determination based largely upon
his critique of shared, defining historical events like the
Civil War. In essence, he argued that many nations were not
genuinely prepared for independence and self-government,
especially of a democratic nature. In fact, even if certain
groups claimed the right to self-government, any lack of
homogeneity would prove detrimental to the effort. Said
Wilson, it was imprudent to label “a miscellaneous people,
unknit, scattered, diverse of race and speech and habit, a
nation, a community.” In other words, according to Woodrow
Wilson, racial and ethnic uniformity ensured greater
success when it came to shared national consciousness and
purpose.51
As a result, Wilson believed that the ideal
independent, self-governing nations achieved their status
only after long, often trying periods of time, apparently
because the unifying bonds required to promote cultural
fitness were slow to progress. Initially distinct and self50
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serving demographic groups presumably required generations
before they could see beyond their own myopic desires and
become part of a larger societal whole. This was even more
important for democracies, which required a greater sense
of shared vision, at least according to Wilson’s
questionable logic on the matter. Regardless, these
historicist notions were, indeed, crucial in the formation
of Wilson’s ideas regarding national self-determination.52
As will become apparent in chapters four and five of
this study, the Wilsonian approach to the principle of
national self-determination became the basis for American
colonial policy, ensuring that various indigenous groups
desiring independence and self-government were deemed
“unfit” and “ill-prepared,” lacking the historically
progressive, unifying features that Woodrow Wilson favored.
His liberal internationalist vision may have been directed
toward altering the traditional colonial structures.
However, as in the case of his domestic progressivism, when
applied to colonial affairs, Wilson’s historicism, as well
as his religious, ethnocentric, and nationalist prejudices
limited his ability to grasp the legitimate claims of non-
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white, non-European peoples concerning their own futures.
When viewed within this context, Wilson’s notions regarding
the Mandate System reveal not only the president’s, but the
overall U.S. position in a completely different light. The
next chapter will introduce the focus of this study, Edward
M. House, and characterize his progressive impulses, which
were closely aligned with Wilson’s. I will then turn to the
origins of the Mandate System concept and analyze House’s
role in overseeing The Inquiry, beginning in 1917.
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CHAPTER 3
EDWARD M. HOUSE’S PROGRESSIVISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
MANDATES CONCEPT
The United States government’s role in formulating the
Mandate System was important, beginning with the Wilson
administration’s concerted efforts to create a working
blueprint for the postwar colonial world in 1917. Many have
received credit for conceiving and molding the mandates,
including Woodrow Wilson himself, South Africa’s Jan
Christian Smuts, as well as their European counterparts at
the Paris Peace Conference. However, a group of American
scholars and statesmen formed in 1917, known as The
Inquiry, was also critical in the broad development of
postwar initiatives, including those affecting the colonial
world. The head of The Inquiry was none other than Wilson’s
close friend and advisor, Edward M. House.
However, before analyzing The Inquiry’s work leading
up to the Paris Peace Conference, an overview of House’s
life and career prior to 1917 will be instructive. In
truth, he came to advocate a brand of progressivism
remarkably similar to Wilson’s. Like his friend, House was
a southerner, possessing an ingrained, keenly-felt sense of
white, Anglo-Saxon superiority. He was a committed
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Darwinist, who believed that Western nations were called to
“civilize” the world and promote human evolution. And
though he was certainly a proud Texan, House was also a
full-fledged American exceptionalist. Hence, to comprehend
the genesis of his beliefs, a sound understanding of
House’s formative years is essential, as is a comprehension
of his intellectual foundations and his early political
experience as a “kingmaker” in Texas.
FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES
Born in Houston, Texas, on July 26, 1858, Edward
Mandell House belonged to one of the wealthiest, most
prominent families in the state. His father, Thomas William
House, had amassed an enormous fortune through the family’s
extensive cotton and sugar plantations. By the time of the
Civil War, the senior House was also making inroads in the
banking industry, expanding the family’s wealth in a new
arena. Interestingly, from 1861 to 1865, Thomas House
prospered further by allowing a small fleet of his ships to
serve as blockade runners, which proved a precarious,
though highly profitable enterprise. The vessels smashed
through Union lines to deliver commodities such as cotton
to Europe and returned carrying valuable provisions,
including munitions that were, in turn, sold to the
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Confederacy. At war’s end, the House family emerged as one
of the wealthiest in Texas at a time when many aristocratic
southern families were either struggling or crippled
financially.1
Edward House came of age after the war ended, during
the latter stages of Reconstruction, which proved some of
the most tumultuous, challenging years in southern history.
Texas in the 1860s and 1870s was exciting to be sure, but
it was also a volatile place to live and raise a family.
There is little to go on concerning the young House’s
relationship with his parents. His mother, Mary Hearn
House, died when he was in his early teens, and it seems
that he and his siblings were largely raised by nannies.
What time they spent with their parents appears to have
been devoted to rather formal interactions, in which father
and mother would inquire about the basic well-being of
their children, perhaps to ensure they were reasonably
well-adjusted. This is not to say that Mr. and Mrs. House
did not love or care for their children, but merely that
the intimate, emotional bonds were somewhat less defined
and prioritized in the House family. Among other things,
1
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instructing their children in matters of personal morality,
religion, philosophy, politics, and culture was largely
left to other adults or the natural accumulation of
personal experience.2
Thus, in sharp contrast to Wilson, whose intellectual
foundations were deeply influenced by his parents, House
came to rely on his older siblings or himself when it came
to the formative virtues. While such parental aloofness may
seem rather absurd in the early twenty-first century, it
was widely practiced in the late nineteenth, especially
among the aristocracy. Moreover, it is important to note
that Thomas House was not completely removed from the lives
of his children, especially after their mother’s untimely
death, at least according to Edward House’s diary entries
during his late teen years. In these, he repeatedly
acknowledges his father’s pride and encouraging words, and
specifically credits House senior with instilling in his
sons a vital understanding of international economics and
corporate (or estate) finance.3
Edward House was deeply affected by the people he
encountered and the events he witnessed prior to 1880,
2
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though many of his formative worldviews were shaped less by
parents and teachers than by his siblings and boyhood
friends. Physically frail throughout his life, House
continually struggled with bouts of malaria, among other
ailments, but he was especially sickly as a child. And yet
he pursued a remarkably active, even robust lifestyle for
someone so infirm. Perhaps one reason is that he spent a
great deal of time with his brash, adventurous brother,
James, whom the younger Edward idolized. In their youth,
the two House boys, “Jimmie” and “Ed,” wreaked havoc,
constantly pitting themselves against one another, as well
as their friends, in harrowing feats of recklessness to
pass the time and achieve the rites of passage common for
boys of the postwar South. Left to their own devices,
however, the boys’ activities often degenerated into
shockingly violent acts of aggression or retribution, such
as bullying unfortunate youngsters they did not like. On
one occasion, they even hanged a fellow schoolmate from a
tree until he turned purple before cutting him free. James
tragically died at sixteen from a brain injury due to a
fall.4
4

“Reminiscences,” 5-6, House Papers, Yale. See also Alexander L. George
and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality
Study (New York: Dover Books, 1946), 76-77.

77
To be sure, there was a great deal of violence going
around. Steeped in war-weary frustration, and resentment
toward the North, southern states like Texas were awash in
chaos and bloodshed. To a degree, House and his boyhood
playmates were simply copying the adults in their spheres
of influence. Reconstruction was as controversial in Texas
as in other southern states. Often, northern policies and
politicians were not well-received. For instance,
encouraged by the presence of U.S. Army troops in the
South, freed slaves and northern “carpetbaggers” frequently
moved in and seized control of local and state government
structures, hoping to initiate and enforce widespread
political reform. This famously happened in Houston in
1873. However, before the newcomers could consolidate their
authority, a disturbing sequence of riots, shootings, and
lynchings followed, initiated by Houston’s native, white
residents, some of whom were aristocrats like the Houses.
Such turmoil became all too familiar in the 1860s and
1870s.5
Urged on by his siblings and friends, the young Edward
House seems to have possessed a rather sadistic streak.
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Even worse, violent interactions were not limited to white
acquaintances in Houston and Galveston. House and his
companions often harassed recently freed blacks, either
verbally or otherwise. He recalled using slingshots, or
“nigger shooters,” to pelt free black passersby with
objects ranging from stones to shards of glass.6
House’s diary entries throughout his teen years
consistently reveal a deeply-felt racism, a sense of AngloSaxon superiority and pride, which is not overly surprising
given his southern upbringing in the late nineteenth
century.7 Establishing this psychological and behavioral
pattern is vital because it confirms that racist notions,
culturally ingrained as they may have been, featured
prominently in House’s psyche from a young age. There are
no indications that House was later involved in formal
groups like the Ku Klux Klan in Texas; nor was he
particularly vocal about his racism in public by the time
of his political partnership with Wilson, though it seems
likely that both men learned the political importance of
curbing their racist views for public consumption. The
6
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point is that, when measuring House’s clear partiality for
Anglo-Saxon civilization and his demeaning, manipulative
proposals for colonial peoples, such views appear quite
consistent with the racist ideologies learned in his youth.
In some respects, the young House thrived in the
chaotic environment of Reconstruction-era Texas. His
aforementioned social experiences instilled in him a sense
of self-reliance and confidence, an ability to measure the
harsh realities of the surrounding world and resolve
personal disputes with direct force when possible, or by
compromising when necessary in pursuit of self-interest.
These resolute abilities were later used in quite different
ways, as House gradually learned to combine such traits
with his passion for the demanding world of politics and
diplomacy.
INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
Though his social experiences dominated much of his
early life, House’s education also played an important role
in his developing worldview. He was a capable, though
unspectacular, student during the years of his formal
education. His physical limitations may have played a role,
because he was frequently forced to curtail his physical
activities and rest while his body recuperated from the
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most recent ailment. At such times, he gave himself over to
reading, a favorite pastime throughout his life. As an
adult, he was a voracious reader in a surprisingly broad
range of subjects. Early on, he enjoyed adventure novels
like many boys his age, though he embraced some classical
literature and history as well.8
The tumultuous nature of Texas politics in the 1870s
particularly intrigued the young man, and from his early
teen years forward he subsequently expanded his interests
into the broader subject of American politics. Even as he
struggled to retain an interest in other subjects, the
realm of politics consistently held his attention. He
attended a number of schools over the years, including the
Houston Academy, a school in Bath, England, while the House
family was living overseas for a year, and lastly two
preparatory schools in Virginia. In each case, House
frequently conveyed frustration at having to learn
mathematical formulas, poetry, or Latin, but wrote quite
favorably of his history and civics courses.9
In 1875, at age seventeen, Edward House was hoping to
enter Yale and prepare for a possible career in either law
8
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or politics, but was rejected when his performance on the
entrance examination proved less than stellar. Apparently,
hunting in the woods and bullying in town had occupied an
inordinately high percentage of House’s energies over the
years, at the expense of his academic preparation. Though
Yale’s president, Dr. Noah Porter, was a friend of Thomas
House, he was not willing to allow the younger House
admittance, at least not until he addressed his academic
shortcomings.10
Hence, House was referred to the nearby Hopkins
Grammar School in New Haven, Connecticut, in the hope that
a year or two of additional preparation in Latin, Greek,
and the classics would prepare him for the rigors of Yale.
At Hopkins, he did study when absolutely necessary, though
he also appears to have shirked some of his academic
responsibilities in favor of pranks and mildly degenerate
behavior whenever possible. More importantly, however, it
was at Hopkins that House befriended Oliver Morton, the son
of a U.S. Senator from Indiana. They shared a deep, abiding
fascination with American politics, and the two became
inseparable. On frequent occasions, the two young men
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visited the Morton residence in Washington, D.C., where
House was not only introduced to Senator Morton, but also
other senators and representatives, and even President
Ulysses S. Grant. During the notorious 1876 election
campaign, Senator Morton lost the Republican presidential
nomination to Rutherford B. Hayes, who went on to become
president after one of the closest elections in history.
Regardless, the experiences with Morton’s family galvanized
House’s interest in politics, and he seemed, at last, ready
to take the next step toward a prominent future.11
Instead of Yale, both House and Morton chose Cornell
University, in Ithaca, New York. It was here that House
initially became enamored of several crucial concepts that
would have a lasting influence on his life and career:
Social Darwinism, Anglo-Saxonism, and the roots of his
American exceptionalist framework. Applying Charles
Darwin’s biological theories to culture more broadly was
intriguing to House, whose fondness for British and
American culture was steeped in notions of white, AngloSaxon superiority. He previously lacked a fully-formed
philosophy that seemed to logically explain Western
11
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Civilization’s dominance in the world. By the late 1870s,
however, there were strong arguments coming from Europeans
like Herbert Spencer, as well as others in the United
States, proclaiming the virtues of the strong over the
weak, virtues that were at least ostensibly based in modern
science. In 1877-1878, several of his professors at Cornell
were explaining, even advocating these ideas in some
detail. Like Wilson and many others, House became convinced
that Social Darwinism was a thoroughly sound, even
practical rationale for Anglo-Saxon cultural superiority, a
notion that would deeply influence his later articulations
of American colonial objectives.12
The broad idea of American exceptionalism came more
gradually to House, partially because, as a Texan, he was
conditioned to favor the Lone Star Republic over the United
States in considerations of loyalty. Still, because of his
genuine appreciation for American history and politics, the
seeds of the exceptionalist framework had already been
sown. While this notion remained largely dormant for House
until the early twentieth century, Cornell challenged him
to consider the possibility that Americans possessed a
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uniquely extraordinary heritage, one that virtually
demanded a projection of their political and cultural
structures associated with national greatness.13
Though House did not distinguish himself at Cornell as
an elite mind, in truth he appears to have grown immensely,
imbibing a far more mature, serious approach to knowledge
than ever before. Unfortunately, his time at Cornell proved
short-lived. In the fall of 1879, during House’s second
year at the university, tragedy struck when Thomas House
suffered a debilitating stroke. Edward left Cornell,
returning to Texas in the hopes of nursing his father back
to proper health. Though the senior House initially seemed
to make a few strides toward some measure of recovery, it
was not long before his health worsened to the point of
crisis, and he died in early 1880.14
Upon reflecting on his possible courses of action,
House decided not to return to complete his degree at
Cornell, nor did he pursue a law career, though he briefly
considered entering the Columbia Law School in New York.
Ultimately, he settled in Texas and took over the reins of
his father’s estate, proving himself a rather capable
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manager. In addition to overseeing the House family
fortune, his primary responsibilities included buying and
selling vast tracts of property throughout the state,
pitting his business acumen against other real estate
developers, many of whom possessed far more knowledge and
experience than the young House. To his credit, he was
remarkably adept at closing deals and earning the respect
of both partners and competitors alike.15
These were good years for House to be sure. In late
1880, he met the lovely Loulie Hunter, herself the daughter
of an aristocratic family, from Hunter, Texas, no less.
They married in August 1881, and then embarked on a yearlong tour of Europe.16 Upon their return to Texas, House
continued in his business venture as before, until 1882. He
longed for something else, something more suited to his
personality and interests. In truth, he clearly longed for
a role in politics, though he was forced to acknowledge
some difficult truths about himself, truths that ultimately
defined his life and career from that point on. In
particular, House came to realize that he would likely
never be able to assume high political office himself, as a
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governor, senator, or certainly as president. His frail
health continually plagued him, and he rightly questioned
his physical ability to discharge the very public
responsibilities of elected officials.17
Based on his diary entries beginning in 1882, House
appears to have been at peace with these realizations.18 He
had always been comfortable in the background, dating back
to his childhood when he played second-fiddle to his
brother James. House was not charismatic, nor was he overly
striking physically. Moreover, he was not a very capable
public speaker. All of these traits appear to have come
crashing in on House’s consciousness as he considered
whether he had a future in politics. In the end, the
psychological resolution was a rather simple one. House
ultimately decided that he actually would be far more
effective as a political advisor, as a “hidden hand” that
guided the thoughts and actions of the powerful.
MAKING OF A WILSONIAN PROGRESSIVE (1892–1912)
In 1886, House and his wife relocated to the Texas
state capital of Austin. On most evenings, they either
entertained guests at their palatial new home, or they
17
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hobnobbed elsewhere at parties with the state’s elite
business leaders and politicians. Because of the honorable
reputation and legacy of Thomas House, his son benefited
immediately, and it was not long before he succeeded in
ingratiating himself to a vast circle of elite, powerful
acquaintances.19
But his family name and connections did not entirely
account for his early successes. House was also a quick
study, and he poured himself into this self-prescribed
internship, devouring the often sordid complexities of the
political arena in Texas, especially those of the
Democratic Party that he favored. As one account put it,
House became deeply interested in learning “all aspects of
the art of manipulating men.”20 Whether it involved
understanding voter trends in the state, measuring
nomination tendencies at party conventions, or even
learning how to manipulate legislative bodies to pass a
desired bill, House vigorously pursued his hands-on
political education. And by the early 1890s, he deemed
himself ready to test his ideas and skills in the crucible
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of Texas politics, though his initial foray proved
challenging.21
In 1892, the incumbent Texas governor, James W. Hogg,
faced a staunch challenge for the Democratic nomination
from George Clark, a well-funded party rival whose
political sponsors included the managing directors of the
Southern Pacific Railroad. As it happened, Governor Hogg
found himself in the crosshairs of the railroad company
because he vigorously opposed monopolistic practices and
had devoted much time and energy to regulating the
railroad’s activities in the state. Hence his political
future seemed grim.22
Enter Edward House, who in this matter aligned himself
politically with moderate reformers of the era, many of
whom spawned the progressivism of the early twentieth
century. Although he had yet to articulate some of these
principles, like Wilson in later years, House actually came
to favor less government oversight of business, in line
with his views on the applications of Social Darwinism to
government, specifically in the economic realm. At least in
part, House already seemed to be gravitating toward the
21
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idea that the federal government’s oversight should
actually be quite limited, preferring instead to encourage
the competitive realities suggested by Darwin’s process of
“natural selection” and Spencer’s “survival of the
fittest.” Again, according to this thinking, by interfering
with business or supporting the “unfit,” the government ran
the risk of unwittingly destroying, or at least inhibiting
social progress.23 Even so, House did believe that overly
large, aggressive business monopolies undermined the very
entrepreneurial competition required to ensure economic
fitness. Hence he opposed the Southern Pacific Railroad in
this instance.
After offering to aid Governor Hogg in his time of
critical need, House served, by his own choice, behind-thescenes as the governor’s key political advisor. After
defeating Clark for the Democratic nomination, Hogg won the
1892 election, and afterward gave much credit to House for
his insightful advice on matters of campaign finance and
legislative reform, among other issues. Moreover, in
partial thanks to House, Hogg also bestowed upon his young
23
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advisor the honorary title of “Colonel,” which remained a
preferred moniker for the remainder of House’s life.24
Over the next sixteen years, Colonel House was an
intimate, though unofficial advisor to four consecutive
Texas governors, including Hogg, Charles Culberson, Joseph
Sayers, and W. H. D. Lanham. In that time, a number of
progressive philosophies emerged in House that bore a
striking resemblance to those of his future friend and
colleague, Woodrow Wilson. House’s brand of progressivism
was steeped in the racist notions of Anglo-Saxonism and
Social Darwinism. Moreover, by the first decade of the
twentieth century, House, too, had increasingly accepted
American exceptionalism as an explanatory framework.25 Given
his own meteoric rise in the realm of power politics in the
United States, such philosophies seemed quite rational to
the Texas “colonel,” whose political career seemed to
mirror the inexorable American rise to global prominence.
By late 1910, House was seeking a greater political
challenge, preferably as an advisor to a politician of
national significance. At this juncture, Wilson remained a
somewhat obscure political “dark horse” on the national
24
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stage. Though elected as New Jersey’s governor in November
of that year, Wilson had yet to move beyond the shadow of
his academic career to become a visionary politician.
Still, House recognized in Wilson the essential qualities
of a strong, capable leader. And by late 1911, he was
convinced that Wilson’s progressive vision was superior to
that of other likely presidential candidates, so House
decided to arrange a meeting with Governor Wilson.26
The two met for the first time at the Hotel Gotham in
New York City, on November 24, 1911. By all accounts, they
liked one another immediately, perhaps sensing the
possibilities that a political partnership might produce.
Even more importantly, after weeks of meeting and
discussing a vast array of political ideas, the two men
realized they shared a surprising number of philosophical
tenets, paving the way for one of American history’s most
productive political collaborations. During the election
year of 1912, House remained in the background as one of
Wilson’s unofficial campaign advisors. By the time of
Wilson’s victory in November and the beginning of his first
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term in March of 1913, the two men were together often; in
fact they seemed inseparable.27
THE INQUIRY AND INITIAL COLONIAL QUESTIONS
Colonel House, as he preferred to be addressed, served
President Wilson in a variety of capacities from 1913 to
1917. Though he lacked an official role within the
administration, House was, nonetheless, part of Wilson’s
inner circle. Over time, he earned the implicit trust of
the president regarding a wide array of political matters,
both foreign and domestic. As Wilson’s most trusted
confidant and advisor, House advised him on a remarkably
wide range of topics, from effective modes of political
dialogue with challenging personalities in the U.S.
Congress to detailed suggestions for Wilson’s New Freedom
program. Yet he displayed a special talent in the arena of
foreign affairs, and he ultimately gained the president’s
confidence to such a degree that Wilson was willing to send
House overseas to negotiate with foreign dignitaries on his
behalf. The most famous outcome of House’s foreign trips
was the House-Grey Memorandum of 1916, inviting the
belligerent nations to consider a peace conference and
further promising a U.S. declaration of war against Germany
27
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if the Central Powers rejected such an offer by the
Allies.28
Ultimately, House was instrumental to the primary
subject of this study, guiding the mandates from concept to
reality. Serving as the president’s principal colonial
advisor, House became not only Wilson’s eyes and ears
during negotiations over mandates in Paris, but also the
key American member of the Mandates Commission that met in
London in the summer of 1919. Though Wilson was certainly
an active contributor to postwar colonial initiatives, he
entrusted House with the responsibility of creating and
articulating the American position regarding the postwar
League of Nations mandates.
Formed in September 1917, the experts of The Inquiry
were given the responsibility to prepare for the peace
conference by identifying key topics of concern in a
variety of fields and then supplying policy positions for
Wilson, House, and others to consider prior to the start of
negotiations. Although every specified division of The
Inquiry fell under his purview, from those considering the
geopolitics of Eastern and Western Europe to those
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analyzing the Middle and Far East, House consistently
gravitated toward the division assigned to formulate
colonial policies and procedures. He conferred almost daily
with the colonial experts, whereas he left the other
divisions to their own devices for weeks at a time.
Noted historian George Louis Beer served as House’s
colonial expert, helping him form the American position on
postwar decolonization in Africa and the Middle East. A
scholar known for his expertise in the field of British
colonialism, Beer was an easy choice for House in his
effort to mold an extensive report on the social,
political, and economic realities present within the
African colonies.29 Among his most influential early ideas,
Beer proposed to House the inclusion of provisions for
indigenous rights and economic free trade, favoring
trusteeship in the colonies rather than the traditional
colonial oversight proposed by Great Britain and France. In
a report for The Inquiry written in December 1917, Beer
clarified this approach, first using the term “mandate” to
describe The Inquiry’s colonial proposals:
In case of any transfer of territory in Central
Africa, and possibly even in the existing depend29
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encies, it might, I think be definitely established,
that the state exercising sovereignty in Africa is
proceeding under an international mandate and must
act as trustee primarily for the nations and
secondarily for the outside world as a whole.30
In subsequent statements regarding the German colonies in
Africa, Beer further acknowledged that political expediency
seemed likely to dominate any negotiations regarding the
fate of colonial subjects. Though he realized his idea
would generate much debate about colonial spoils of war
among Britain and France, Beer nonetheless advocated
altering the geopolitics in Africa by depriving Germany of
its colonies. After all, Germany’s autocratic colonial
policies prior to 1914 all but ensured the loss of its
possessions at war’s end. Hence, in German East Africa,
Beer advocated several initial resolutions, including one
for less stringent colonial immigration laws allowing nonEuropeans greater access to the territories. He also
criticized the prewar boundaries in West Africa. Here Beer
recognized France’s political claim to the portion of
Cameroon seized by Germany in 1911. Nonetheless, for the
rest of Cameroon, he proposed trusteeship, whereby the
former colonies would be overseen by a multinational body
until they were ready for independence. Perhaps realizing
30
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this idea might be unwelcome by the British and French,
Beer included a reserve option, saying that if his proposal
was deemed unfeasible, the only solution might be to
”assign part of the Cameroons to British Nigeria and part
to French Equatorial Africa.”31
In researching and writing these various reports for
The Inquiry, Beer brought House up to speed on key
precedents set by international law. Specifically, he
viewed the Berlin Act of 1885 as a major turning point for
colonialism in Africa. Ostensibly, the Berlin Conference
(1884-1885) was held to regulate African trade and
navigation rights, particularly on the Congo and Niger
Rivers. In reality, the conferees merely rationalized
territorial annexation by signing a collective agreement
congruent with codes of international law. Article 34 of
the Berlin Act reveals these motives, stating:
Any power which henceforth takes possession of a tract
of land on the coasts of the African Continent outside
of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto
without such possessions, shall acquire them and
assume a protectorate.32
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Article 35 vaguely elaborated on these imperial designs,
suggesting that the conference delegates “ensure the
establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them
on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to
protect existing rights.” As historian Niall Ferguson
rightly asserts, these statements completely ignored the
indigenous people and their legitimacy.33
George Louis Beer and Colonel House both recognized
these legalities as positive trends. They appeared to
believe that Wilson’s League of Nations could serve as a
buttress against naked aggression and colonial subjugation,
saying “it is not unjustifiable to wage such wars in Africa
. . . but it is ignoble to use Africa merely as a pawn to
purchase security elsewhere at the expense of the native.”34
Yet, while his statements regarding the protection of
indigenous peoples seemed altruistic, subsequent documents
reveal that House and, to a lesser degree, Beer both shared
Wilson’s notions for a more progressive strain of
imperialism, especially those philosophies reminiscent of
the British Empire’s administrative network in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.35 As noted Anglophiles,
33
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Beer and House relished their membership in the British
Round Table, which likely affected their colonial
opinions.36 In truth, both largely favored accommodation
with Britain and France concerning the colonies. Beer and
House both sought to dismiss blatantly abusive colonial
administration, favoring trusteeships over granting
universal freedoms to indigenous people. Fearing the
consequences of granting political, economic, and military
freedom, even the idealistic Beer lamented that “arming the
natives” with such freedoms would seriously “imperil the
delicately balanced fabric” of allied relations.37
This is not to say that the idea of self-determination
supplied by House (through Beer’s work) was deceitful. In
fact, House truly sought national self-determination,
albeit in a form agreeable to his own progressive
“Wilsonian” worldview. Ultimately, the president and his
colonial advisors were intent on modifying the traditional
formula for outright colonialism, rationalizing their own
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imperial philosophies by using idealistic rhetoric.38
Wilson’s early comments on the topic suggest that he
was weighing colonial alternatives without committing to a
particularly entrenched stance, a strategy reminiscent of
Beer’s position. However, in keeping with his statements
about the League’s moral value, Wilson sought to imbue the
colonial settlement with humanitarian overtones that would
prevent the looming Allied annexations from appearing
blatantly aggressive. The president provided a glimpse of
this veiled form of neo-imperialism in an oft-cited
interview with Sir William Wiseman on October 16, 1918. In
an effort to clarify his progressive vision, as contained
in the Fourteen Points, Wilson condemned the atrocities of
German colonialism and then decried previous international
commissions as both inept and self-serving. He shamelessly
declared his League of Nations to be the ideal nonpartisan
entity for colonial administration. The president’s views
are readily apparent in Wiseman’s interview notes, in which
he writes of Wilson:
He must warn the British, however, of the great
jealousy of the other nations—including, he regretted
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to say, a large number of people in America. It would,
he thought, create much bad feeling internationally if
the German colonies were handed over to us as a
sovereign part of the British Empire. He wondered
whether there was some way in which they could be
administered in trust. “In trust,” I asked, for
whom?” “Well, for the League of Nations,” he said.39
Soon after, Wilson approved the rendition of the
Fourteen Points that had been prepared by the secretary of
The Inquiry, Walter Lippmann, and his colleague Frank Cobb,
the editor of the New York World. Colonel House utilized
this draft of the key ideas contained in the Fourteen
Points throughout negotiations in Paris.40 Of particular
interest to House were Lippmann’s and Cobb’s editorial
comments on Point 5, which addressed German colonies and
other colonial territories that could conceivably be
objects of imperial desire when the war ended.41 Juggling
the Franco-British concerns over ongoing colonial
stability, Lippmann and Cobb suggested that “exploitation
should be conducted on the principle of the open door.”42
Despite the blatantly imperialistic overtones, this notion
39
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influenced Wilson and House in later discussions with the
Allies.
Given their shared sentiments regarding Anglo-Saxon
cultural superiority, it is no surprise that Wilson and
House also revealed distinctly racist perspectives in their
contact with minority leaders at home and abroad. A prime
example is W.E.B. Du Bois, who favored creating a central
African state composed of the former German colonies as
well as the Belgian Congo. Du Bois believed this proposal
aligned with the African desire for independence. It was
endorsed by the NAACP Board of Directors in 1919 and then
submitted to the Wilson administration.43 However, even
though, on the surface, these notions were congruent with
Wilson’s and House’s idealistic rhetoric on national selfdetermination, not surprisingly, it proved too liberal or
progressive to gain Wilson’s approval.
Soon after his arrival in Europe for the peace
conference, Wilson read The League of Nations: A Practical
Suggestion, by General Jan Smuts of South Africa.44 Smuts
has often been credited for the progressive mandates
concept. In his proposal, Smuts outlined a colonial system
43
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that could, conceivably function under Wilson’s League of
Nations. Hence, at least in principle, trusteeship was to
be favored over annexation. However, before Smuts’
reputation as a genuine progressive is written in stone,
the following bears mentioning. Regardless of his stated
idealism, Smuts was not genuinely committed to colonial
independence. In truth, his imperial designs are not
difficult to identify, because he was far more blatant in
his rhetorical advocacy of continued spheres of colonial
influence. In this vein, Smuts argued that because there
were differing levels of colonial development, selfdetermination could not be administered without thought for
inherent geopolitical and cultural realities. Hence,
according to Smuts, while certain peoples might be on the
brink of readiness for self-government, others were less
developed, and therefore “autonomy in any real sense would
be out of the question.”45
At first it seemed Smuts might be willing to advocate
shared oversight of mandated territories, meaning Wilson’s
League would collectively determine whether former colonies
had the right to national self-determination. However,
Smuts rejected direct international administration as
45
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impractical. Instead, he urged that the League utilize “the
administrative organization of individual States for the
purpose.” This could be accomplished “by nominating a
particular State to act for and on behalf” of the League.46
Smuts’ proposals were significant, though perhaps not
to the extent claimed by scholars over the years. George
Curry characterized Wilson’s response to the Smuts plan by
saying, “this document, more than any other of its kind,
was to excite the imagination of the American President.”47
In truth, though Wilson valued the articulate ideas in
Smuts’ proposal, he certainly did not view the concepts as
original. After all, under House’s oversight, The Inquiry
had made similar proposals beginning in 1917. Wary of
Smuts’ interest in annexing German Southwest Africa, Wilson
nonetheless recognized the value inherent in the South
African leader’s ideas. His proposals could serve as
preliminary blueprints for Wilson, Beer, and House as they
prepared for the upcoming Paris Peace Conference and
juxtaposed their views on self-determination with those of
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Smuts to create a controlled vision for a progressive
future in colonial areas of the world.48
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CHAPTER 4
EDWARD HOUSE, WOODROW WILSON, AND COLONIAL NEGOTIATIONS AT
THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
Woodrow Wilson and Edward House arrived in Paris
hoping to secure their progressive international vision
through intense, reasoned dialogue with their political
counterparts, especially the delegates from Britain and
France. Wilson and House were at least mildly apprehensive
about their impending diplomatic responsibilities; yet they
both entered the conference believing their principles
would garner a favorable reception, with key elements of
the Wilsonian progressive vision serving as something of a
philosophical blueprint for the future of humanity. Such
lofty expectations proved challenging given the vast array
of geopolitical issues facing the delegates, from border
reallocation and economic reparation to more tedious, petty
rhetorical debates over assigning blame for the travesty of
the war itself.
Still, there was reason to hope, especially regarding
the postwar colonial settlement, which Wilson and House
were eager to define. When the conference began on January
12, 1919, it became evident that colonial issues were
prioritized by each of the key delegations. In fact, the
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mandate system’s basic framework was in place by the end of
the month, based partially on several important ideas
articulated by Jan Smuts, but more notably on the concepts
of trusteeship and League oversight established by House
and The Inquiry beginning in 1917.
INITIAL COLONIAL DECISIONS AT PARIS
As indicated previously, the lion’s share of scholars
have assumed that the Wilsonian vision was inherently
idealistic, entailing the literal, universal pursuit of
equality and independence for indigenous peoples under
colonial rule.1 However, as this study has shown, the
reality was that Wilson and House were both committed to
their applied understanding of Anglo-Saxonism, Social
Darwinism, and Christianity in Wilson’s case, as well as a
dedication to the idea of American exceptionalism, all of
which informed their philosophical approach to progressive
politics. For their part, Wilson and House favored a
colonial plan based largely upon the rhetorically laudable
Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. But,
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while their liberal internationalist vision may have been
directed toward altering the old, traditional colonial
structures, their ethnocentric and nationalist prejudices
limited their ability to grasp the legitimate claims of
non-white, non-European peoples living in colonial regions.2
Even a non-white conference delegation like Japan was
faced with a hard fight against the European and American
delegates in Paris and London. Japan’s hopes of expanding
its empire in the Pacific were viewed with suspicion by the
Franco-British members. After shocking the world by
defeating Russia in 1905, Japan had embarked upon a
significant industrial expansion program during the Taishō
period (1912-1926). At the very least, Japan sought
inclusion in the open trade agreements overseen by the
Europeans and Americans. Japan’s imperial ambitions were
much larger, however. In truth, they hoped to challenge
Europe’s colonial stranglehold in East Asia and assume that
mantle of authority themselves.3
A Japanese diplomat named Kijūrō Shidehara was crucial
in paving the way for Japan’s imperial vision. Among other
Pacific island holdings, he and Viscount Chinda both sought
2
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the acquisition of China’s Shantung province as part of
Japan’s expanding Pacific empire. This, of course, would
prove extremely controversial given the fact that China had
been promised the return of Shantung if Germany lost the
war. Moreover, Japan’s desire for the inclusion of a racial
equality amendment in the League covenant proved
challenging, namely because British, French, and American
delegates did not view the Japanese as equals. Hence this
was a precarious issue during negotiations in Paris and
London.4
The British, French, and American delegates took the
lead on the colonial settlement. Both Wilson and House
anticipated that the League of Nations would ultimately be
given administrative oversight of colonial territories in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, thereby providing the
United States and the European victors with the power to
define independence as they saw fit and simultaneously
oversee the gradual move toward independence for colonial
peoples. The League’s oversight would not be cast in such
an autocratic light, of course. After all, Wilson and House
genuinely believed that a new colonial system could be
4
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forged that would reflect the progressive Wilsonian vision
for a new, enlightened order in the postwar world. In the
eyes of Wilson and House, the blatantly abusive colonial
order of the past had to be scrapped in favor of a new
system that aligned with Wilsonian progressive standards,
inspiring loyalty and trust in the process.5
From the start, however, it became clear that the
progressive notions held by Wilson and House were not
entirely understood or embraced by the British and French
delegates. While they were not completely at odds with one
another, the British delegation, led by Prime Minister
David Lloyd George, sought to fine-tune the existing
colonial system. Rather than a system framed largely within
Wilsonian progressive philosophy, Lloyd George and his
British colleagues favored minor adjustments to the
traditional form of colonialism that could be administered
within the existing confines of the British Empire.6
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Lloyd George, Robert Cecil, and Arthur Balfour assumed
it was necessary to provide a quid pro quo for British
Dominions as partial payment for their loyal service to
Britain from 1914 to 1918. Lloyd George, in particular,
wanted to ensure that the Union of South Africa, Australia,
and New Zealand received the former German territories they
each desired: German Southwest Africa, New Guinea, and
German Samoa, respectively.7 That Britain sought additional
colonies was not surprising to House and Wilson. What truly
concerned them was the fact that Lloyd George proposed to
engage in open colonial annexation, in the process
blatantly violating the rhetoric of Wilsonian progressive
principles like national self-determination.8
It is not that Wilson and House were naively expecting
the victorious powers to grant immediate independence to
all indigenous peoples under colonial rule. Neither man
sought such a dramatic turn of events in the colonial
world. However, both House and Wilson did believe the
European colonial system was too often marred by corruption
and brutality. Moreover, while certain colonial peoples
seemed clearly “backward,” and incapable of self-rule, it
7
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seemed possible that others deserved at least a chance for
independence in the not-too-distant future. Of course, as
American exceptionalists, House and Wilson arrived full of
their own virtue, eager to convince their rival delegates
of the merits of Wilsonian progressivism, which should be
applied in the colonial world.9 The stage was set for much
debate.
This became clear during a meeting on January 24,
1919, when the Council of Ten decided that none of the
colonies would be returned to Germany. On the surface, this
was reasonable to Wilson and House, both of whom believed
that punishing Germany by seizing its colonies was a
perfectly acceptable course of action. However, when Lloyd
George and the British delegates further argued against
broad international control over colonial administration,
Wilson and House attempted to avert any early bad blood by
introducing their ideas for the mandate system to the other
delegates. To their great surprise, David Lloyd George
embraced the idea of a mandate system from the start, and
was (in theory) willing to accept the structure on behalf
of Britain. In his opinion, it “did not differ materially
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from the method in which the British Empire dealt with its
colonies.”10
Such a statement was obviously problematic. It
highlighted the British belief that their administration of
colonial peoples was broadly acceptable and enlightened,
and thus that developing the mandate system would simply
serve as a legal and rhetorical mechanism for ongoing
British imperialism. Essentially, nothing would be overly
affected by political and structural change in the
colonies. To be sure, the French thought similarly, as will
be revealed. Not surprisingly, then, Lloyd George called
for outright annexation in the territories sought by the
British Dominions of South Africa, Australia, and New
Zealand, respectively. He then allowed the Dominions to
present their claims for pursuing annexation, based
primarily upon strategic considerations and geographical
location.11
For his part, Jan Smuts, the affable, yet enigmatic
leader of the Union of South Africa, was concerned that
America’s Wilsonian vision might endanger his colonial
10
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designs in the former German colony of Southwest Africa,
writing that Wilson was “entirely opposed to our annexing a
little German colony here or there, which pains me
deeply.”12 Smuts decided upon a rather shrewd strategy in an
effort to turn the tide in his favor. In essence, he went
out of his way to persuade the gathered delegates of the
uniqueness of German Southwest Africa. “The Cameroons,
Togo-land, and East Africa were all tropical and valuable
possessions; South-West Africa was a desert country without
any product of great value and only suitable for
pastoralists.” Hence, he argued that his Union of South
Africa was the logical choice for developing this former
German colony, while simultaneously decrying the need for
mandates. According to Smuts, the mandate system might
deserve serious consideration in other African regions, but
“there was not, in this instance, a strong case.”13 Hence
British Dominions like the Union of South Africa forcefully
pushed to annex the territories they respectively desired.
Britain proper sought the mandate for East Africa. However,
Lloyd George envisioned an extremely limited role for
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Wilson’s League, preferring British colonial administration
over any multinational body.14
Four days later, the French began pressing their
colonial claims in Cameroon and Togo. Desiring even less
international administrative oversight, the French
delegation promoted a sweeping plan of annexation in
western Africa. Addressing the Council of Ten on January
28, 1919, French Colonial Minister Henri Simon pressed for
colonial rewards as well. He specifically argued that
France was “entitled to them for the same reasons that had
been used by the British Dominions.” He further suggested
that “the large sea coast of the Cameroons, and the port of
Duala were required for the development of French
Equatorial Africa.”15 Finally, after acknowledging the
British Dominions’ concerns regarding international
oversight, Simon provided a rather surreal philosophical
defense of French colonial history, ending with an
erroneous promise that France would secure and protect the
indigenous rights in Togo and Cameroon and that free trade
practices would be initiated in both colonies. In this,
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Simon sought to appease the American delegation and forge
ahead with the proposals for annexation.16
Not surprisingly, President Wilson and Edward House
responded by unequivocally rejecting British and French
proposals they viewed as blatantly imperialistic and
totally counter to the progressive ideals they espoused,
ideals that many Americans and Europeans supposedly
favored. Wilson, in particular, observed that “the
discussion so far had been, in essence, a negation in
detail–one case at a time–of the whole principle of
mandatories.”17 In the hope that Wilson and House were not
entirely opposed to ongoing colonial enterprises, British
Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George attempted
to appease Wilson and House while still achieving their
aims. Lloyd George soothingly promised Britain’s
cooperation in administering German East Africa under
League provisions, and further stated that France seemed
quite amenable to the mandates concept, despite Simon’s
rhetoric to the contrary.18 Clemenceau also responded in a
conciliatory manner. This was, however, unsurprising given
his desire to subordinate colonial issues within French
16
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foreign policy. According to historian Brian Digre, just as
Simon’s presentation had represented the French colonial
ministry’s annexationist ambitions, Clemenceau’s European
focus allowed him to abandon them. Digre further observed
that Lloyd George, though he agreed with certain elements
of progressivism embraced by Wilson and House, had
interpreted Simon’s speech better than Wilson.19
Clemenceau elaborated by expressing a willingness to
make concessions as long as viable resolutions existed. In
a clear effort to appease both of his allies, the French
premier continued:
He did not regret the discussions which had taken
place on the subject, since these discussions had
impressed him with the justness of the claims of the
Dominions. However, since Mr. Lloyd George was
prepared to accept the mandate of the League of
Nations he would not dissent from the general
agreement, merely for the sake of the Cameroons and
Togoland.20
Ultimately, the meeting was adjourned without a resolution
on the mandate concept. Yet, it was evident that during the
meeting of January 28, an Anglo-French alliance was forged,
accepting certain principles of the mandate system for the
former German and Turkish territories.21 From Wilson’s and
House’s perspective, however, much remained to be discussed
19
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before the mandates came to fruition. Specifically, they
desired to distance any new system from traditional
colonialism, and they were particularly eager to avoid the
perception of blatant expansion evident in the Anglo-French
proposals.22
In the following days, European and American leaders
devised a carefully crafted compromise, which aimed at
appeasing American concerns over the mandates being seen as
the League’s disguise for annexation. President Wilson was
not part of these negotiations, leaving House to forge a
reasonable compromise with his British and French
counterparts. Late on January 28 and early on the 29th,
House met with Robert Cecil, Henri Simon, and several
others. After much deliberation, they formed the basis of
the three-tiered mandate system, later designated A, B, and
C. In essence, the proposal for three classes of mandates
favored categorizing the conquered territories on the basis
of their geographic locations, simultaneously appointing
League member governments as arbiters who would determine
the political viability of indigenous leaders in Africa and
the Middle East, and ultimately decide whether the
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respective countries were ready to design and run their own
governments.23
The territories were to be assigned to one of three
classes of mandates. A-mandate countries were deemed to be
nearly ready for self-government, only requiring a minimal
period of political oversight by the League of Nations
before independence became a reality. B-mandate nations
required more time. These countries would be assigned to a
League member in trust, who would be responsible for
overseeing the territory’s progressive development under
League provisions, ensuring the prohibition of illegal
trade in slaves, arms, and alcohol, while also curtailing
militarization. C-mandate territories would technically
function under the same provisions as the B-mandate
countries, though they would be under even more extensive—
and long-term—control by the League.24
Ostensibly, of course, the three-tiered plan allowed
the mandated territories to gradually prepare for outright
independence as they moved through the mandate categories.
Eventually, the A mandates consisted of the former Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, whereas most of Germany’s
23
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former African colonies formed the B mandates. However, the
C mandates, consisting primarily of the countries sought by
the British Dominions, were organized as a veiled form of
annexation. Hence there would be ongoing debate over how to
present the C mandates as benevolently as possible in order
to implement the entire system.25
Woodrow Wilson was grateful to House, Cecil, and the
others, and was genuinely intrigued by the three-tiered
concept, though he was slow in recognizing that much
remained to be done, and that further compromise was likely
to occur if the mandates were ever to become a reality.26
Still, the president’s affirmation of the tiered mandate
system is significant because it again confirms the true
leanings of Wilson and House regarding the administrative
fates of the colonies and their people. Few countries were
likely to gain near-immediate independence as class A
territories. Most would be identified as either B or C
mandates, meaning that Wilson’s League would function, for
the foreseeable future, much the same as mother countries
had for centuries in the colonial world. The League would
define and oversee much of the bureaucracy. It would
25
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somehow measure whether indigenous peoples could modernize
sufficiently, becoming self-sufficient through
industrialization. Most importantly, the League would
possess the authority to oversee cultural growth in the
postwar colonial world, meaning elements of Wilsonian
progressivism could be introduced and perhaps sustained in
the far corners of the world. To be sure, Wilson and House
both favored such possibilities.
Even the C-mandates, for all their ideological
challenges, did not horrify the president. In truth, it
seems that Wilson was less concerned with the political
practicality of the C mandates than he was with the
perceptions that would result from their existence. In
Wilson’s mind, it was one thing to allow the League of
Nations to sanction a mandate that technically—and
covertly—allowed for something akin to annexation. It was
quite another to publicly frame the mandate with blatantly
imperialistic rhetoric.27 As we know, neither Wilson nor
House was eager for “undeserving” native peoples to receive
outright independence, especially if they were not aligned
with Wilsonian progressive standards. However, given the
fact that the world was watching, it did not seem prudent
27

Council of Ten Minutes, January 29, 1919, FRUS:PPC, 3: 786.

121
for the victorious powers to flaunt imperialism, whether
traditional or new. Clearly, there would have to be more
discussion on the three-tiered structure, specifically the
C mandates.
The British delegation had created a committee on
mandates composed of the prime ministers of the southern
Dominions. By the afternoon of January 29, 1919, Lloyd
George possessed a preliminary draft of the system that
would prove to be remarkably close to the final version of
the proposal.28 Smuts then verified Colonel House’s
acceptance of the draft, assuming that Wilson also
approved. It was subsequently approved by the British
Empire delegation later that day.29 Then, on January 30,
Lloyd George gladly offered the draft to the Council of
Ten, though he acknowledged that it represented a rather
tenuous compromise. For his part, Wilson considered the
draft “very gratifying,” further remarking that it
succeeded in making a “long stride towards the composition
of their differences, bringing them to within an easy stage
of final agreement.”30
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However, shortly afterward, the negotiations again
stalled due to a surprisingly intense disagreement between
President Wilson and Australia’s Prime Minister, William
Hughes, after the latter reiterated his nation’s desire for
direct rather than League-administered oversight of Cmandated territories. In response to Hughes’ diplomatic
gaffe, Wilson argued that mandate decisions to that point
be considered provisional only, infuriating Hughes and
other delegates of the British Dominions, who felt they
deserved to be instantly granted their desired territories
after being so conciliatory earlier regarding the use of
annexationist rhetoric. The fiery debate was extinguished
only when Lloyd George advised provisional acceptance of
the C mandates, to which the other delegates agreed.31 In
1922, the provisional British draft was adopted nearly
verbatim into Article Twenty-Two of the League Covenant.
Paragraph seven of the British draft dealt specifically
with Germany’s former colonies. It read as follows:
They [the Allied and Associated Powers] further
consider that other peoples, especially those of
Central Africa, are at such a stage that the
mandatory must be responsible for the administration
of the territory subject to conditions which will
guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave
31
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trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and
the prevention of the military training of the natives
for other than police purposes, and the establishment
of fortifications or military and naval bases, and
will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and
commerce of other members of the League of Nations.32
This proposed clause fostered much further debate
regarding the conditions of the mandates for Cameroon and
Togo. At a Council of Ten session on January 30, Canada’s
Prime Minister, Robert Borden, suggested clarifying the
language to ensure the prohibition against using C mandates
for any military purpose, a change garnering quick support
from Wilson and House.33 Predictably, however, the French
sought to protect their right to conscript troops in their
mandated territories. In this matter, Clemenceau was joined
by Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon in advocating France’s
needs for security in all French-controlled territories.
Seeking to mediate a compromise, Lloyd George argued in
favor of the clause, claiming that while it was a
protective measure designed to prevent colonial powers from
“raising great native armies against each other . . .
there was nothing in this document which prevented France
from doing what she did before” as a colonial power.34
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Clemenceau subsequently acquiesced, remarking that “if
he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.” The debate
continued for another hour or so, but was ultimately
settled according to Lloyd George’s proposal.35 In truth,
however, the language of paragraph seven was sufficiently
imprecise so as to generate competing interpretations
concerning French conscription of indigenous personnel.36
Thus House would be forced to contend with this issue again
while in London as a member of the Mandates Commission.
Final Colonial Developments in Paris
The Council of Ten’s formulas in late January 1919 for
the mandate system provided a general theoretical framework
for a comprehensive colonial settlement. These compromises
were significant, however. In fact, the provisional draft
of the League Covenant, presented by Woodrow Wilson to the
third plenary session on February 14, included each of the
major mandate system resolutions passed in January. These
were subsequently written into the final Covenant during
the fifth plenary session on April 28, 1919. Still,
additional negotiations were required before a working
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colonial settlement could be drafted and presented in full
detail.37
One crucial issue involved Japan’s colonial petitions,
which remained unresolved at this stage. Like their British
and French counterparts, Wilson and House feared an
increased Japanese presence in the Pacific, primarily
viewing Japan’s colonial ambitions through the lens of
race. In this sense, it was bad enough to consider granting
independence to newly formed indigenous governments, but
even worse to acquiesce to an “inferior” racial power like
Japan. Hence, throughout negotiations in Paris and London,
the American delegates resisted compromising their stated
commitments to Wilsonian progressivism by granting Japan
its colonial desires too quickly, or without
qualifications.
Prior to the fifth plenary session held on April 28,
matters came to a head. Wilson and House were hoping to
dissuade Japan from seeking to acquire the Shantung
province in China. Again, the Chinese expected Shantung’s
return upon the defeat of Germany. In April 1919, Wilson
and House still sided with China, recognizing their
position as inherently sensible given the geographic and
37
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cultural realities. In an effort to persuade the Japanese
to relinquish their claim on Shantung, Wilson suggested
that Japan would not require (or benefit from) any special
interests in Shantung because of the League’s impending
recognition of the “open door” principle.38 Viscount Chinda
and the Japanese delegates remained unmoved, demanding that
Germany’s claims to the Shantung province be transferred to
Japan. Finally, when Chinda threatened to prohibit Japan
from signing the peace treaty unless they acquired
Shantung, Wilson at last relented. In the end, Wilson and
House apparently decided it was less dangerous to alienate
the Chinese in order to secure Japan’s future membership in
the League.39 Whether or not that decision was sound
remained to be seen.
Beginning on April 30, 1919, the delegates of the
great powers who advanced the mandate system toward a
finalized structure were known simply as the Council of
Four, composed of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and
Italy’s Vittorio Orlando. Having quarreled with the others
over the Adriatic settlement, Orlando had temporarily
returned to Italy, reducing the number to three. Even with
38
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Orlando absent, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, as an
informal “council of three,” found plenty to argue about.
Their respective subordinates—Edward House, Lord Robert
Cecil, and Henri Simon—were also present and active in
these ongoing discussions over mandates in Paris.40
Predictably, several unresolved disputes that had lain
dormant since January reappeared during the Council of Four
discussions during the first week of May.41 The foremost of
these involved Belgium’s claim to part of the former German
East Africa. On April 24, 1919, the Commission on German
Colonies had composed the following statement: “Germany
renounces, in favor of the Five Allied and Associated
Powers, all its rights and titles to its overseas
possessions.”42 In addition to the United States, Britain,
France, and Italy, the fifth of these powers was Japan,
whose colonial ambitions rivaled those of France. Not
surprisingly, Belgium reacted negatively to this
proclamation, assuming its claims in East Africa were in
danger of being nullified. In response, Belgium’s premier,
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Paul Hymans, asked Clemenceau to speak on Belgium’s behalf,
which he did at a council meeting on May 2, 1919.43
The British and American delegates did not initially
favor Belgium in this matter. In fact, Lloyd George
adamantly opposed altering the language of the clause to
include a “sixth power,” believing the Belgian claim was
“most impudent,” further remarking that millions of British
soldiers had fought for the cause of Belgium during the
war, whereas “only a few black troops had been sent into
German East Africa.” Moreover, Wilson and Lloyd George both
implied that affirming the Belgian claim in detail was
perhaps a premature exercise given the fact that the clause
was not intended as a formal draft of specific mandate
provisions. Clemenceau agreed, and relayed the council’s
decision to the Belgian delegates, pledging that the League
of Nations, once officially formed, would be responsible
for hearing final proposals on the matter of German East
Africa.44
Lloyd George was eager to complete the colonial
settlement in Paris, remarking on May 5 that he was “most
anxious to be able to announce the mandates to the Press at
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the time when the Peace Treaty was issued.” However, Wilson
still had certain reservations and responded apprehensively
to Lloyd George’s proposal for a prompt settlement. Wilson
was particularly concerned, saying he hoped to prevent “the
appearance of a division of the spoils being simultaneous
with the Peace.”45 Further consideration of the former
German colonies was scheduled for the following afternoon.
Perhaps inevitably, given the delegates’ levels of
physical exhaustion, some final clashes occurred at the
sessions on May 6 and May 7. At this late stage, resolving
the future status of Cameroon and Togo was one topic that
proved difficult, generating debate. Filling in for an
absent Lord Milner, the French Colonial Minister, Henri
Simon, provided an overview of Anglo-French negotiations on
Togo and Cameroon to that point. The future of Cameroon
appeared settled, at least in principle. Hence the
delegates quickly agreed to assign Cameroon as a French
mandate, though a provision was added requiring France to
clarify and resolve the ongoing border dispute with
Nigeria.46
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Deciding Togo’s fate, however, required more elaborate
discussion. In this case, both Lloyd George and Clemenceau
opposed a formal mandate structure, with Britain’s prime
minister declaring that “the country was cut into small
bits, and it might be found that half of a tribe was under
a mandate, and the other was not.” Wilson challenged the
Anglo-French opposition, not because of the logic, but
rather because he was opposed to blatant imperialism
outside the framework of mandates. After assurances that
Henri Simon would draft a proposal to resolve the issue,
Wilson agreed to this provisional resolution on Togo.47
On the morning of May 7, two final disputes had to be
resolved before the delegates could issue the colonial
proposals. First, the French delegation went back on the
previous day’s agreement regarding Cameroon. Clemenceau and
Simon again stipulated French sovereign rights to the part
of the Cameroon territory that Germany had acquired from
France in 1911, given that the British would directly annex
a slice of German Cameroon to Nigeria without a mandate.
In essence, Simon demanded a quid pro quo given that
France’s acquired territory in Cameroon was to be assigned
as a mandate under League supervision. Lloyd George and
47
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Balfour briefly attempted to rationalize their previous
position. Second, the British and French delegations had
not yet agreed to the division of German Togoland between
them. Avoiding further delay while seeking an agreement in
Paris, Lloyd George proposed to postpone a final settlement
for Cameroon and Togo until later when the French and
British would make a joint recommendation to the League of
Nations regarding the future of these former German
colonies. Wilson did not object to this compromise, which
would give the League a supervisory role in this eventual
colonial settlement.48
One final debate emerged over whether Italy deserved
territorial compensation given the nature of British and
French imperial gains in Africa. The Italians feared an
exclusionary colonial agreement, denying them a place at
the mandate system table. Citing the Treaty of London
(1913), they reminded their British and French counterparts
that Italy was promised “colonial compensation” if the
German Empire faltered and Anglo-French imperial expansion
occurred in Africa. Subsequently, in an effort to appease
the Italian delegation, both Lloyd George and Clemenceau
readily conceded these Italian claims and further promised
48
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to bring them before the League of Nations at a future
point to be determined.49
Late on May 7, 1919, the initial mandate system
proposal was submitted in Paris. It proved remarkably
similar to the notions supplied by Edward House and George
Louis Beer more than a year earlier as part of The
Inquiry.50 House and Beer had designed provisions for
indigenous rights and economic free trade, favoring
trusteeship in the colonies rather than the colonial
oversight proposed by Great Britain and France. Both
recognized the new colonial structure as positive. After
all, through the mandate system Wilson’s League of Nations
could pursue ostensibly enlightened progress for colonial
peoples, promising them freedom and independence in the
future, while ensuring that Western, specifically American,
cultural values reigned. While House and Wilson sought
national self-determination, they did so in ways that were
agreeable to European colonial interests within the
rhetorical framework of their own ideas of Wilsonian
progressivism. Ultimately, the president and his colonial
emissary, House, were intent on modifying the traditional
49
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formula for outright colonialism, rationalizing their own
philosophies in the process.51
Yet, seizing upon Woodrow Wilson’s stated commitments
to equality and national self-determination, many scholars
have assumed that Wilson and the American delegation were
forced to abandon their high ideals in favor of appeasing
the Allies.52 However, despite the various concessions made
at the Paris Peace Conference, the creation of the mandate
system should be viewed as a significant achievement for
the American delegates. While Wilson and House adamantly
objected to blatant colonial expansion through annexation,
they did so because the former trappings of colonialism did
not fit into their own progressive, yet still controlled,
notions of trusteeship. Throughout the Paris Peace
conference, Wilson and House repeatedly met to discuss the
ongoing colonial negotiations. At times, both men were
frustrated by certain ideas put forth by the British and
French delegations in particular, such as the French
argument for using colonial troops to secure French
strategic interests. However, as the negotiations in Paris
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were winding down, Wilson and House conveyed a sense of
satisfaction with the colonial formula, viewing it as an
outright success rather than a capitulation to French and
British imperial interests.53 Despite occasional
confrontations between the delegates, true Wilsonian
principles remained intact. Writing in his diary on May 8,
House noted that the vast majority of the colonial
settlement had “been fostered . . . in accordance with the
highest of ideals.”54 Crucially, the fact that Wilson’s
League would be granted supervisory control over the
mandate system suggested that Wilsonian progressivism could
be instilled regardless of French or British imperial
designs.
After all, Wilson endorsed the resolution requiring
the United States to serve as the League’s mandatory power
in Armenia. The U.S. Senate failed to pass the eventual
treaty, declining American membership in the League of
Nations; hence the United States never actually accepted
the Armenian mandate. However, the American delegation’s
mere compliance with the original resolution is perhaps the
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most obvious indicator of the veiled form of imperialism
present in the minds of Wilson and House. Rhetoric aside,
they failed to account for the inherent geopolitical
realities of a pluralist world, instead sanctioning a
mandate system that continued to favor white, European
influence over indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the League
would decide upon the future form of administration to be
adopted in many of the colonial areas. As indicated in the
previous chapter, Wilson’s League would determine whether
former colonies had the right to self-determination.
When measured alongside paternalistic notions of
bringing “civilization” to the “savage” races, the true
Wilsonian intentions seem more apparent. The primary
concern rested not on ensuring colonial peoples’ fullfledged freedom from foreign governments, but on finding a
new, acceptable way of bestowing American progressive
standards on colonial peoples. While perhaps different from
traditional forms of European colonialism, these ideas
simply represented a new brand of imperialism, wrapped in
the League of Nations and multi-national control. The
colonial discussions initiated in Paris continued
throughout the summer of 1919. After Wilson and many of the
other delegates left Paris and returned home, House
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prepared for an even more intensive term of service in
London as the chief American representative assigned to the
Mandates Commission.
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CHAPTER 5
EDWARD M. HOUSE AND THE COMMISSION ON COLONIAL MANDATES:
JULY – AUGUST 1919
Perhaps because of a greater historical profile,
colonial negotiations during the Paris Peace Conference
itself have received far greater attention from historians
than they have devoted to the subsequent implementation of
the new system of mandates. Yet, the Commission on Colonial
Mandates that met in London throughout the summer of 1919
was, at the very least, equally responsible for the
colonial settlement eventually adopted as Article TwentyTwo of the League of Nations Covenant in 1922. In fact,
though a rudimentary framework for the mandate system was
in place when the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June
28, 1919, much work remained before the mandates could
actually be designated and assigned.
FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON COLONIAL MANDATES
Formed by the Council of Four on June 27, 1919, the
Commission on Colonial Mandates was given the significant,
but unenviable, charge of finalizing the structure of the
colonial settlement. Specifically, the commission was
designed to accomplish four major tasks: to analyze Belgian
and Portuguese demands in German East Africa, to conversely
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hear the appeals of the indigenous Aborigines Societies
regarding German East Africa, to draft a report detailing
these divergent interests, and finally to draft the model
A, B, and C mandates for eventual consideration by the
governing members of the League of Nations once its charter
was formally established.1 The five commissioners selected
to head the negotiations were Edward House for the United
States, Lord Alfred Milner for the British Empire, Henri
Simon for France, Senator Guglielmo Marconi for Italy, and
Viscount Chinda Sutemi for Japan. Britain’s Lord Robert
Cecil and George Louis Beer from the United States also
served in advisory roles.2 Notably absent from the
commission were the four leading statesmen at Paris—Wilson,
Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—each of whom appeared
comfortable delegating the responsibilities for further
colonial decisions to these aforementioned advisors.
President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States
immediately after signing the Versailles Treaty, weary from
the grueling months of peacemaking in Paris.

Already in a

weakened state, he had other matters on his mind as he
journeyed home. He was preparing for what proved to be the
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most heated political confrontation of his presidency, a
debilitating battle with the U.S. Senate over ratification
of the peace treaty and his prized League of Nations.3
Hence, though the president continued to receive detailed
reports from Edward House on the progress of the Mandate
Commission in London, his focus was elsewhere during the
summer and fall of 1919.
Wilson’s absence from the commission is noteworthy
because it signifies a meaningful transition in the
diplomatic command structure after the completion of the
German peace treaty at the Paris Peace Conference. The
president, who functioned as the chief U.S. delegate during
the conference, withdrew from further colonial negotiations
at a crucial stage.

Beginning on June 28, 1919, intent on

other tasks, Wilson assumed a greatly reduced role in
finalizing the basic structure of the mandate system.
Amazingly, this transitional change in colonial decisionmaking has been virtually ignored by historians, most of
whom were more interested in analyzing either the European
colonial demands in Paris or the finalized settlement
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accepted by the League of Nations in 1922.4
In considering the significance of Wilson’s minimal
role alongside the primary role of Edward House, two key
questions arise. The first involves Wilson’s decision to
delegate primary responsibility for the colonial settlement
to anyone else at this time.

After all, it seems clear

that the president was deeply interested in devising a new
colonial system characterized by his own progressive vision
for national self-determination. Why, then, did Wilson
allow anyone else to dictate Wilsonian principles on
colonialism to the Allies during the mandate system’s final
stages of development? The second issue centers on the fact
that, of all people, House was the individual authorized by
Wilson to be the principal U.S. commissioner for the
remaining colonial discussions at a time when their once
close partnership had supposedly reached a tumultuous and
sudden end. Perhaps the best way to address the first issue
of the president’s withdrawal from colonial negotiations is
to make sense of the second, to place the allegedly
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compromised relationship between Wilson and his longtime
friend and adviser in proper context.
THE INFAMOUS BREAK BETWEEN WILSON AND HOUSE
Over the years, scholars have repeatedly attempted to
explain why the intimate bond of friendship that existed
between Wilson and House did not survive the Paris Peace
Conference. Most have concluded that the rift occurred over
a period of months, beginning sometime in March of 1919,
amidst the highly stressful atmosphere of the peace
negotiations, and becoming progressively more apparent by
the treaty signing in June.5 However, while there can be
little doubt that a “break” of sorts occurred in Paris,
claims that the rift was so extreme as to permanently
destroy their mutual respect and admiration for one another
most likely exaggerate the actual nature of the parting.
In fact, the reasons behind the so-called “break”
remain unclear, though historical speculation has centered
upon a few common themes. Believing that Wilson had
developed serious reservations about House’s personal and
political loyalties by the signing of the treaty, a number
5
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of historians have argued that Wilson was the one who took
action. These analyses specifically allege that the
president became increasingly frustrated by Colonel House’s
habitual predilection for conducting what might be termed
as “extracurricular” diplomacy, meeting alone with foreign
officials or dignitaries and engaging in supposedly
unsanctioned negotiations. Though questions surrounding
Wilson’s health and state of mind are often factored in to
the equation, ultimately these interpretations forcefully
argue that Wilson’s distrust and frustration with House,
irrational or not, grew until reaching a zenith, at which
point the president had no choice but to sever ties with
House in order to safeguard American policy from his
careless, albeit well-intentioned, diplomacy.6
Admittedly, there is some truth to the fact that House
tended toward pretentious behavior, viewing himself as a
superior diplomat, far more suited to personally negotiate
foreign policy than others in the administration, including
Wilson himself. However, there is a paucity of evidence
indicating that House willfully exceeded his diplomatic
authority, either in formal negotiations or in more casual
conversational settings. To be sure, Wilson and House
6
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differed in their negotiating philosophies. Whereas Wilson
was often unwilling to compromise, even on the minutiae of
treaty phraseology, House tended toward a more conciliatory
approach to diplomatic discussions. Still, based on the
evidence available, it seems House’s policy objectives
remained in line with those of Wilson. The colonel simply
realized, perhaps better than the president, that measured
compromise was necessary, even preferable, in order to
secure broader policy goals. Furthermore, while House and
Wilson occasionally disagreed in private about the proper
formulation and application of foreign policy, the evidence
overwhelmingly suggests that House ultimately abided the
president’s decisions, regardless of any personal
misgivings he may have had.7 This is not surprising, given
their shared progressive visions.
Thus, charges that House was somehow undercutting
presidential authority and pursuing his own diplomatic
agenda in Paris or London are most assuredly false. In
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truth, the arguments for Wilson’s vehement disillusionment
with House (or visa versa) appear to be anecdotal, based
largely upon the rumors and innuendos created first by
contemporaries of the two men, and subsequently seized upon
by scholars convinced that such a close friendship could be
undone solely by personal disloyalty or some unforgivable
act of political disloyalty undertaken by House or profound
misunderstanding by Wilson.8
A more likely theory regarding the so-called “break”
involves Wilson’s second wife, Edith Bolling Galt Wilson,
whom the president married in December 1915. If any one
person could conceivably be charged with subverting the
intimate ties between President Wilson and Colonel House,
it would be Edith Wilson, especially because of her fervent
desire to be her husband’s closest friend, companion, and
adviser. In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that
the second Mrs. Wilson felt extremely threatened by anyone
whose relationship with the president rivaled her own, in
as much as that was possible. Moreover, she never hid the
fact that she was specifically bothered by Wilson’s
relationship with House, often questioning the president
8
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about House’s true loyalties and commenting on the
colonel’s seemingly endless list of shortcomings, all the
while contrasting these with the prized character traits
she so admired in her husband.9 Wilson surely appreciated
the high praise of his wife, and undoubtedly began to
increasingly heed her counsel over time. Whether or not
Edith Wilson truly loathed House, and further counseled
Wilson to discard their friendship, remains unclear.
However, she most certainly did not have a high opinion of
the colonel, or Mrs. House for that matter, and her
jealousy may very well have been a key factor in driving a
wedge between the two men.
In any case, over time, Edith Wilson asserted herself
as much more than just the president’s loving spouse.
Perhaps inevitably, she assumed many expanded roles, acting
behind the scenes as the president’s trusted counselor,
dispensing advice and providing emotional support whenever
possible, especially after Wilson’s health declined visibly
during the peace negotiations, a factor which has also been
used to explain the dissolved friendship. This argument
centers on the increasingly frequent displays of anger,
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aggression, and paranoia displayed by President Wilson
immediately before, during, and after the peace conference.
Innumerable stresses affected Wilson’s ability to think and
act rationally on occasion. In fact, as recent scholarship
has shown, these anomalies were most likely physical signs
that Wilson’s health was so severely compromised that he
may very well have been experiencing a series of smaller
strokes in early to mid-1919, prior to the near-fatal
stroke he suffered in October of that year. Hence, it is
possible that the president was more vulnerable than he
typically would have been to suggestions of House’s
disloyalty made by Edith Wilson, the president’s physician,
Dr. Cary Grayson, and Secretary of State Robert Lansing,
among others.10
Ultimately, there can be little doubt that a once-warm
friendship and political partnership between Colonel House
and Woodrow Wilson was permanently compromised, though I
believe it dissolved not from a profound change in mutual
trust or personal malice, but primarily as a resulting
combination of personal and political expediency. After
all, even the closest bonds of friendship evolve. A more
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realistic appraisal suggests their enormously beneficial
partnership had simply run its course. The two men, whose
resolutely independent temperaments were remarkably
similar, had simply outgrown one another by mid-1919.
While theories of Edith Wilson’s jealous intrigues and
her husband’s questionably irrational state of mind offer
partial explanations, they do not account for a rather
stark reality. Despite any personal differences that
existed by June of 1919, House retained the president’s
confidence as his most trusted colonial emissary. Wilson
knew and trusted House’s personal and political integrity.
To suggest otherwise would be counter-intuitive. If,
indeed, he had serious reservations about House, Wilson
surely would not have allowed him to head the American
delegation in London that finalized the crucial mandates
issues, especially given the plethora of qualified
ambassadors and scholars at the president’s disposal,
including Beer and David Hunter Miller, among others. The
fact of the matter is that House remained the ideal choice
for Wilson, especially given the colonel’s considerable
background in forming colonial policy, specifically U.S.
notions of the mandate system.
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And so, as he had done prior to the peace conference,
Wilson delegated primary responsibility for American
colonial policy to House. On June 29, 1919, the morning
following the treaty signing, Wilson embarked on the ship
heading back to the United States. Sadly, this farewell, in
which House encouraged the president to “meet the Senate in
a more conciliatory spirit,” proved to be the last meeting
between the long-time friends. Though they continued to
exchange correspondence, both official and personal, they
never actually saw one another again. Wilson’s response to
House’s plea revealed the president’s uncompromising state
of mind by that time. Whereas House was still prepared to
engage in measured compromise to achieve larger, vital
policy objectives, Wilson had apparently become
increasingly rigid, declaring: “House, I have found one can
never get anything in this life that is worth while without
fighting for it.”

In a rather melodramatic rejoinder,

House, forever the Anglophile, tellingly reminded Wilson
that the bedrock of “Anglo-Saxon civilization was built up
on compromise.”11
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PREPARING FOR THE COMMISSION ON COLONIAL MANDATES IN LONDON
Wilson’s confidence in his old friend, Edward House,
seemed well placed. For his part, House had been
instrumental in advocating further, detailed analysis into
the form and function of mandates. In a letter to Wilson on
June 23, 1919, House adamantly expressed his concern about
the mandates, remarking: “I feel with Lord Robert [Cecil]
that perhaps one of the chief duties of the Peace
Conference will be left undone unless some authoritative
statement is made at once concerning the mandatory
system.”12 House further detailed to Wilson his support for
Lord Cecil’s proposed commission, believing it to be a
vital initiative for improving the fundamentally vague
mandates concept in place at that time. Logically, he
argued, after actually drafting the three classes of
mandates, the commission would then open their colonial
resolutions to public debate, whereby “criticism will be
invited just as it was invited with regard to the Covenant
of the League.”13 Yet, for all of his interest and concern,
House was somewhat forlorn about being assigned as a member
of the Commission on Colonial Mandates, viewing the
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appointment as yet another unsought responsibility that
forced him to remain overseas. Confiding to his diary on
June 21, 1919, House revealed a desire to return home to
the United States, saying, “I am eagerly anticipating a
triumphant return home in the wake of this exhausting work
in Paris.”14
In the end, however, House agreed to serve as the head
of the American delegation to London, once again appointing
George Louis Beer as his chief advisor in this enterprise.
In light of the heated discussions on colonialism during
the peace conference, House realized that Beer’s expertise
would be vital in providing greater legitimacy to any and
all American perspectives offered in further colonial
negotiations. To be sure, Beer’s background as a colonial
historian had proven valuable during the peace conference,
and House understood he would need further assistance. In
many respects, Beer was again an ideal source of
information, providing House with a ready interpretation of
colonial positions taken by their counterparts from
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. However, House was the
final arbiter in London regarding American colonial policy.
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House seems to have relished his renewed autonomy. He
certainly had benefited from the president’s confidence as
head of The Inquiry in 1917 and 1918, prior to the Paris
Peace Conference. At that time, he was given primary
authority to form and mold colonial policy with little
interference from anyone, even Wilson. Now, as the lead
U.S. delegate in London, House once again became
responsible for defining and molding the American colonial
initiatives according to the progressive political and
cultural standards that he and Wilson embraced.15
In truth, as the head of The Inquiry as well as the
chief U.S. delegate on the commission responsible for
finalizing and assigning the mandates, House likely
deserves more credit than President Wilson for creating the
colonial system eventually adopted by the League of Nations
in 1922. However, with greater authority comes greater
responsibility. As shall be made evident through his
service in London in July and August of 1919, House’s
application of “Wilsonian” national self-determination to
the former German and Turkish colonies deserves much
scrutiny, especially because of the imperial philosophies,
both subtle and overt, contained in the colonial settlement
15
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reached by House, Beer, and the other members of the
mandates commission.
NEGOTIATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE MANDATES COMMISSION
Technically, the first formal meeting of the
Commission on Colonial Mandates was held in Paris, on the
morning of June 28th, the day of the treaty signing.
Presided over by Britain’s Lord Milner, this initial
gathering appears to have been held primarily to formulate
a tentative meeting schedule in London. In fact, like
several other members, House opted not to attend, sending
Beer in his stead.

The next Mandates Commission meeting

was scheduled ten days later in London.16
The only topic of discussion generating debate at this
preliminary meeting involved the specific nature and
application of B and C mandates in relation to the Pacific
Islands and Southwest Africa, namely whether or not these
two territories could both be designated as part of the
same class. Viscount Chinda from Japan was rather adamant
about branding the islands north of the Equator as B-class
mandates only if those south of the Equator—namely the
territories in Africa and the South Pacific sought by

16
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Britain, France, and the Dominions—were given the same
designation.

17

This is no surprise given Japan’s desire to

achieve strategic equality, even dominance in the Pacific.
While no consensus was reached on this specific issue, the
collective desire of Britain, France, the Dominions, and
Japan to seek C-class mandates did not sit well with Beer,
and he said as much to both Cecil and House later that
evening.18 Again, Beer, House, and Cecil surely opposed the
Japanese proposal not only because of any misgivings they
had about achieving a status quo on the B and C mandates,
but also because of their inherently racist perspectives
regarding Japan’s capacity to serve as a mandate power.
From the beginning, Beer viewed the three-tiered
mandate structure as problematic because it seemed to open
the door to rampant manipulation by the mandatory powers.
The C mandates were especially troubling because they were
structured to allow for complete territorial oversight on
the part of the mandatory power, meaning that, for all
intents and purposes, traditional colonial administration
would continue in the C-class countries. Not only was Beer
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upset by such blatant attempts to prolong colonialism, he
was also anxious over the thought that European countries
assigned to oversee the progression of B-class mandates
might seek to downgrade their given territory to C-class in
order to be granted administrative carte blanche.19
Essentially, Beer anticipated the blatantly imperial
designs of the delegates assigned to London. In his brief
conversation with House and Cecil on the evening of June
28, he specifically warned them of the impending clash over
territorial definitions, claiming Wilson’s ideal of
national self-determination was in jeopardy unless the
other commission members could be swayed.20 Yet, in voicing
his initial concerns about the upcoming negotiations, Beer
also displayed a distinct lack of comprehension regarding
the progressive ambitions for the colonial world that
Wilson and House possessed. These differences would surface
repeatedly during the weeks of negotiation and compromise
in London, forcing Beer to re-evaluate the true nature of
Wilsonian progressivism.
For his part, House attempted to assuage Beer’s stated
concerns by promising to uphold and endorse the Wilsonian
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commitment to liberal internationalism in the form of selfdetermination in colonial territories.21 Not surprisingly,
Beer was initially quite pleased to hear such affirmation
coming from House, though Beer gradually realized that
House’s notions of progressive philosophy as applied to
colonial territories differed from his own far more than he
anticipated.22 However, House, as he prepared for the time
in London at the end of June, was confident that the final
colonial structure formed by the Mandates Commission would
measure up to the progressive standards that he and Wilson
sought. Confiding to his diary on June 30, 1919, House
conveyed his optimism, saying, “I believe the colonial
mandates will be one of the chief accomplishments of the
United States if the commission in London proceeds
according to our expectations.”23 His confidence proved
well-placed, at least if we measure the final resolutions
against the progressive standards of Wilson’s and House’s
liberal internationalism.
The road to a finalized colonial structure was not
without its challenges, however. From the start, it became
clear that the old-guard European colonialists favored less
21
22
23
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oversight from the League and more administrative autonomy
regarding both B and C mandates. The delegates met at
Sunderland House twice on July 8, 1919, the first full day
of negotiations in London. Since several topics had been
broached during the preliminary discussion of June 28,
these sessions were designated as the second and third
meetings of the commission, respectively.
The first priority was supposedly confined to drafting
the B and C mandates and attempting to resolve the dispute
between Belgium and Portugal over their competing claims in
German East Africa. However, while initiating this
discussion at the second meeting, a rather heated exchange
broke out over an outlandish French proposal seeking
compulsory military service for indigenous peoples in
French-administered C-class territories, including the
shocking demand that France be allowed to post such forces
to France proper for defense purposes. Simon claimed the
request had been granted during a Council of Ten meeting in
Paris on January 30, though in reality both Wilson and
Lloyd George had vehemently opposed the idea at the time.
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Clemenceau had backed off and seemingly abandoned the
notion.24
House was therefore quite angry that Simon and the
French were attempting to push this idea through in London.
He and the British commission members rejected Simon’s
request out of hand. House even claimed, rather
melodramatically, that such a provision could jeopardize
the American acceptance of the peace treaty. Simon
responded by reiterating the French position voiced in
Paris–that a colony was “really no different than a
mandate.”25 Thus, the French sought only to administer their
mandated territories as they would any colonial possession.
Such open truth shocked the more idealistic members
present, including Beer, but in the end, tempers cooled and
the matter was pushed to the side. Since House, Cecil, and
Beer objected to the proposal, Simon and his French
colleagues chose not to press the matter further, though,
in the end, it remained conspicuously unresolved. It is
important to note, however, that House’s objection to
France employing indigenous forces for strategic security
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grew from his belief that such a blatantly imperialistic
colonial practice would jeopardize the progressivism that
he and Wilson relied upon to inspire the masses, both in
Europe and the colonial world. He stated as much in his
diary, saying that regardless of the French right to
administer territory as they saw fit, “using native
military personnel would undermine the integrity of the
mandates through imperial posturing.”26 House therefore had
no desire to support a proposal that would likely generate
a great deal of unnecessary hostility and possibly garner
bad press.
Significantly, initial model drafts of the B and C
mandates were completed during the commission’s third
meeting in the afternoon of July 8.27 They strongly
resembled the structure outlined in Paris. The B-mandate
nations required more time than those under A mandates
before becoming fully independent. These countries would be
assigned in trust to a League member, who would then be
responsible for overseeing the territory’s progressive
development under League provisions. C-mandate territories
would technically function under the same provisions as the
26

House Diary, July 9, 1919, House Papers, Yale.
Notes of the Third Meeting of the Commission on Mandates, July 8,
1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American Commission to
Negotiate Peace.
27

159
B-mandate countries, though they would be under even more
extensive—and long-term—control by the League.28
Unfortunately, soon the delegates were arguing over
other matters. At the fourth and fifth meetings of the
commission, the issue of economic equality inside B and Cmandated territories proved contentious. The French
delegation favored allowing the mandatory power, rather
than native personnel, to administer utilities (such as
telegraph lines) and build or expand basic infrastructure
(such as railways). According to this notion, the
indigenous populations could easily be deprived of economic
independence and vitality because the mandatory power could
dictate the economic processes, from overseeing basic
public works to choosing which bidders received
construction contracts.29
Lord Robert Cecil and George Louis Beer strenuously
objected to the idea. Cecil asked why it should matter
which nationality built something like a railway. Lord
Milner voiced his concern as well. But Simon responded by
stating, “it would be most unfair that all the benefits of
28
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occupation under the Mandate should go to the foreigners
(indigenous peoples) and all the cost to the Mandatory
Power.” Viscount Chinda agreed in principle with the French
proposal, hoping to secure Japan’s administrative oversight
in its own mandated territories.30
Though, strangely, Cecil is often credited with the
compromise plan, in actuality House proposed the middle
road. In order to resolve the debate over the economic
extent of administrative oversight as well as the possible
cost-revenue disparity, he proposed that each mandatory
power be allowed to create economic infrastructures
independently of other countries, stating “the Mandatory
Power shall be free to organize essential public works and
services on such terms and conditions as it may think
just.”31 Thus a degree of administrative freedom was
established, appeasing Simon and Chinda in particular.
However, House followed this statement by suggesting
that the natives should have recourse if the mandatory
power abused its authority in the economic realm. In a
rather clever move, he proposed that, upon its formal
establishment, the League of Nations executive council
30
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should be the final arbiter in these matters. Hence, as
with most of the peace provisions, Wilson’s League would be
responsible for determining whether social and economic
progressivism was being served in the mandated territories.
This was quite a diplomatic coup, and House was no doubt
thrilled when his proposals were accepted by the other
commission members in a meeting on July 10 at Sunderland
House.32 House sent a telegram to Wilson in Washington,
D.C., with a full report on the B and C mandates.33
Beer left London for Paris on July 13, and remained
there until August, when he rejoined the commission. House
was actually grateful for the autonomy over the last half
of July. For his part, House still valued Beer’s colonial
insights and scholarly mind, but felt that true Wilsonian
progressivism might be hindered if Beer’s overly idealistic
notions were given too much credence.34 Conversely, Beer’s
diary reveals a growing distaste for House, both personally
and professionally.35 The time apart proved valuable for
both.
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In Beer’s absence, House, Milner, and Cecil pursued
several shared objectives in their negotiations with Simon,
Chinda, and Italy’s delegate Guglielmo Marconi, the first
of which involved whether the indigenous peoples should
incur debt for the vast costs of economic and political
administration by the mandatory powers. France and Japan
favored a rather high debt ceiling, with unforgiving
interest rates imposed on the territories, to help offset
the costs of trusteeship. At a meeting on July 14, the
commission members forged an agreement advocated by House,
Cecil, and Milner that ostensibly offered the native
peoples a reasonably balanced approach to the debt issue,
in which the League would place limitations on overall debt
to be repaid. The details would be worked out at a future
time, once the League was established. House reported to
Wilson that he was pleased that “there was general
unanimity of purpose to protect the natives in every way
possible.”36
Nonetheless, this was one of the key ironies of the
entire negotiating process, conveying the philosophical
depth of Euro-American cultural imperialism. If the
36
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mandatory powers had been willing to forego their neocolonial designs and allow the former German and Turkish
colonies to achieve independence, the costs of territorial
administration would have been limited and short-lived.
Driven by their own ambitions, however, the conquering
nations had chosen to pursue the formation of the mandates.
Yet here they conveyed a desire to possess the territories
and pin the economic burdens on the very people whose
future freedom and independence they supposedly sought. If
anything highlights the neo-imperialism of the mandate
system, this is it. The idea signaled nothing more than a
veiled form of traditional colonialism, the likes of which
had ravaged indigenous cultures for centuries.
In mid-to-late July, a few outstanding issues were
addressed by the commission members, ranging from Liberia’s
progressively-staged loan payments to the necessity of
curtailing arms and liquor traffic in East Africa. The
discussions on these topics were relatively straightforward
and intuitive, requiring limited negotiation. However,
hearing the Belgian and Portuguese claims to parts of
German East Africa remained a crucial task for the
commission members. In the initial discussion of these
claims on July 16, the delegates decided to focus on the
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Belgian proposal and delay the Portugal discussion until a
later date.37
The debate over the Belgian claim to part of German
East Africa centered upon King Leopold’s notoriously brutal
colonial policies in the Congo during the late nineteenth
century. How, asked Lord Robert Cecil, could the commission
seriously consider acquiescing in Belgium’s request given
its colonial atrocities of the past? Though he was in Paris
during these meetings, Beer later expressed similar
concerns about supplying Belgium with a mandate. However,
at the eighth meeting on July 17, the commission made the
decision to hold off on a final resolution for a few weeks,
allowing the commission members to further consider the
stakes of the Belgian claim in the former German East
Africa.38 In fact, during the third and fourth weeks of
July, the commission members decided to spend some time
away from the burdens of foreign relations. House spent the
time resting for the most part, though he did socialize in
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the evenings with a number of British friends and
acquaintances, including Winston Churchill.39
By the first week of August, the commission members
were ready to resume their full-time duties and finalize
the remaining resolutions. The delegates met briefly on the
morning of August 5 to discuss the Belgian and Portuguese
claims, but decided to postpone the discussion until later
in the evening.40 Finally, during the tenth meeting of the
commission, the Portuguese and Belgian claims to parts of
German East Africa were resolved. Portugal desired a small
triangle of the former German colony, arguing that the
territory had been theirs prior to German conquest. Given
these historic roots, the Portuguese claim seemed quite
reasonable to the commission members. Only Beer expressed
any doubts, though he was not overly adamant about these. A
brief debate ensued over whether the sliver of territory
merited a mandate. Lord Milner thought granting a mandate
for such a miniscule portion of land was absurd, and
therefore, in a show of arbitrary imperialism, he proposed
simply assigning the area as Portuguese colonial territory,
free from oversight as a mandate by the League. This
39
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proposal was quickly accepted, and the commission moved on
to resolve the Belgian claim.41
In the end, regardless of their misgivings about
Belgium’s capacity to oversee a part of German East Africa
in a manner befitting an enlightened, progressive power,
the Belgian claim to Ruanda-Burundi was upheld. Belgium was
assigned this territory while the British Empire acquired
most of the former German East African colony under the
provisions of B-class mandates. Beer and Cecil were deeply
concerned about this resolution, but nonetheless went
along. Since Belgium was a strategic and cultural ally of
France, House and Milner both felt that blocking the
Belgian claim would be both counterproductive and
destabilizing, especially given the contentious nature of
French colonial policy. House even suggested that giving
the lands to someone other than Belgium—namely Great
Britain—would strengthen the anti-British opposition to the
peace treaty. It was that simple. As Beer wrote in his
diary, “in such ways are the fates of three-and-a-half
million human beings determined.”42
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By the second week of August, the only remaining tasks
involved drafting the A-class mandates and then providing
recommendations for the League of Nations regarding the
mandate assignments for the various nations. The only
significant change to the A mandates as outlined in Paris
involved a clause recommending that the mandatory power be
responsible for securing civil order as the A-class nation
neared its final goal of independence. The B and C mandates
were structured along the lines of the July 8 meeting.43
The commission concluded its resolutions in late
August by recommending the assignment of mandates according
to the following categories: Class A Mandates were to be
quite limited in number, primarily because they were
supposedly ready to be “brought along swiftly” toward
outright independence, though none achieved that status
until the 1940s. Nonetheless, the commission’s proposal
suggested dual mandates for Great Britain in Palestine and
Mesopotamia, though the latter was not enacted. The French
were also given Syria as an A mandate.44
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Class B mandates were more plentiful. These, of
course, required greater levels of political oversight by
the mandatory power, but were intended for independence at
a “reasonable point in the future.” The protectorates of
Ruanda and Burundi, formerly of German East Africa, were
suggested for Belgium, to be administered as a single
mandate. The British were to gain Tanganyika and then split
the Cameroons and Togoland with the French, as agreed upon
in Paris.45
Lastly, Class C mandates were to be assigned along the
following lines. The peoples in these territories would
ostensibly require long-term oversight by a mandatory power
until ready for independence at an indeterminate date in
the distant future. Australia was slated to receive
mandates for the former territories of German New Guinea,
renamed Papua New Guinea, while New Zealand would acquire
German Samoa, renamed Western Samoa. As proposed, Japan’s
South Sea Mandate would involve former German territories
in a number of Pacific Islands, including the Marianas and
the Marshall Islands. And, of course, Jan Smuts’ South
Africa would be granted what they coveted most, the freedom
to combine their own territory with the former German
45
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South-West Africa.46 When Article 22 of the League of
Nations Covenant was formally adopted in 1922, the mandate
system assignments conformed to these recommendations, with
only a few minor adjustments.47
A brief concluding critique of Edward House and the
Mandates Commission is in order. What did the commission
members generate in July and August of 1919? Obviously, the
mandatory powers were given extensive political and
economic authority over the former German and Turkish
territories, especially in the B- and C-class mandates. In
essence, the idea that traditional colonialism would vanish
in favor of enlightened trusteeship and progression toward
political and territorial independence by colonial peoples
was largely false. Instead, the mandate system’s imperial
legacy became evident, as resolution after resolution
favored the mandatory powers’ control over indigenous
peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The question
is, how complicit was the United States in forming the
system’s imperial elements during the London meetings? The
traditional view is that House was overly conciliatory
without Wilson’s guiding presence in London, too willing to
46
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compromise American principles and acquiesce in European
imperial claims, especially with his British friends, Lord
Robert Cecil and Lord Alfred Milner.48 In other words, he
sold America (and Wilson) out on the colonial issues. Is
this true?
The reality is that Wilson and House were consistently
in contact throughout July and August. House sent telegrams
every few days to Wilson as well as Secretary of State
Robert Lansing, informing them about the proposals and
resolutions of the Mandates Commission. Wilson was
certainly not kept in the dark. More importantly, however,
the president never challenged the positional statements
that House included in these telegrams. Rather, Wilson
conveyed pleasure and confidence in the work that House,
Milner, Cecil, and the others were achieving. On July 18,
Wilson sent a telegram to House in which he affirmed, “I
find the model mandates B and C quite satisfactory.”

At

his meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
August 19, the president reaffirmed: “The whole system of
mandates is intended for the development and protection of
the territories to which they apply—that is to say, to
48
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protect their inhabitants, to assist their development
under the operation of the opinion of the world, and to
lead to their ultimate independent existence.”49
None of this is surprising. The colonial system
established in Paris and London was, in reality, well
aligned with the progressive standards of Wilson and House,
both of whom sought to overhaul traditional colonialism,
while ensuring their progressive standards could still be
structured and implemented globally according to the
Wilsonian standard. House accomplished these goals in
London, most importantly through his continued insistence
that the League of Nations retain final authority over the
colonial administrative processes. We must remember that,
from the beginning, the League was intended to function as
an extension of Wilsonian philosophy, an instrument of
progressive culture on the international stage. By ensuring
the League’s authority over the colonial world vis-à-vis
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the Mandate System, Edward House successfully served
Wilson’s true principles.
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CONCLUSION
The mandate system of 1919 was ostensibly created to
ensure cultural progress and eventual independence for
colonial peoples. However, as this study has shown, in
reality the mandates ultimately served as the foundation
for ongoing colonial practices in Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East. Not until the post-World War Two era did many
colonial territories finally gain their independence as new
nations, often through brutal, hard-fought wars against the
very governments assigned, in 1919, as benevolent trustees,
charged with overseeing the indigenous nations’ prosperity
and growth.
In Alabama in Africa, Andrew Zimmermann reached a
similar conclusion with particular reference to Togo. He
observes: “The American ‘Negro question’ became a
foundational feature, blacks themselves a constituent
exclusion, of the international order that emerged between
the Berlin West African Conference and the Paris Peace
Conference. Excluding blacks not only from what was called
civilization without outside intervention, helped Europeans
and Americans found a League of Nations to enforce what was
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supposed to be universal.”1 Emphasizing continuity from the
previous European colonial imperialism to the new system of
mandates under the League’s supervision, Zimmermann
continues, “The transnational ‘Negro question,’ the
attempts by white elites to impose interlinked regimes of
political and economic control over African Americans and
Africans, became fundamental to the renewed colonial
civilizing mission of the League of Nations.”2
What responsibility did the United States have in
these affairs? While the evils of the mandate system are
generally acknowledged, most historians believe that the
American delegates at Paris and London were forced into
numerous compromises by Britain, France, the British
Dominions, and others. Such interpretations are deeply
flawed because they frame Edward House and Woodrow Wilson
as overly naïve idealists who misunderstood both the
realities of the postwar world and the imperial designs of
their European counterparts. By defining President Wilson’s
rhetoric on national self-determination in literal terms,
which seemed to promise quick progress toward independence
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for colonial peoples, most scholars have portrayed the
mandates as indicators of American diplomatic failure.
The reality, however, was that colonial imperialism
did not continue simply because Wilson, House, and other
American peace delegates buckled under pressures from less
idealistic Europeans. The Wilsonian worldview was far more
complex. While Wilson’s own liberal internationalist vision
sought to alter traditional colonial structures, it did not
conform to the idealistic progressivism embraced by many of
his contemporaries, nor did it align with the subsequent
definitions by many scholars. Wilson and House were not
seeking immediate independence for most former German and
Turkish territories. Their understanding of progressive
civilization was not based on notions of universal liberty
and equality. They looked down on native cultures deemed
inferior to Anglo-Saxon civilization. Moreover, the United
States actually took the lead in forming postwar colonial
policy, advocating change that proved far more
imperialistic than many scholars acknowledge.
Beginning in 1917 with his supervision of The Inquiry
and ending in 1919 with the Mandates Commission in London,
Edward House was responsible for molding and assigning the
colonial settlement. Guided by Wilson, and imbued with the
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president’s enlightened notions, House fashioned an
eminently suitable structure that neatly aligned with the
Wilsonian philosophy of cultural progress. Hence, despite
the various concessions made by Wilson and House, the
creation of the mandate system should be viewed as a
significant achievement for Wilsonian progressivism as
understood by both men.
In essence, Wilson and House were intent on modifying
the traditional forms of colonialism, using idealistic
rhetoric to rationalize and convey their own imperial
philosophies. After all, Wilson and House founded their
postwar colonial vision on the principle of national selfdetermination, specifically defined as an extension of
Wilsonian progressivism. Moreover, they stipulated that the
League of Nations would administer any colonial structure
created and assigned by the delegates. Again, Wilson’s
League would be granted the power to decide whether the
indigenous peoples were ready to govern their own fates. It
would, paradoxically, determine national selfdetermination.
By August of 1919, the final resolutions by the
Mandates Commission affirmed this crucial aspiration. After
months of negotiation, the commission formally recommended
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the mandate system for implementation by the new League of
Nations. Its provisions ensured League supervision of the
colonial settlement. This was significant. Ultimately, the
colonial system established in Paris and London was well
aligned with the progressive standards of Wilson and House,
both of whom sought to overhaul traditional colonialism,
while ensuring that cultural progress could still be
structured and implemented globally according to their
Wilsonian standard. Moreover, the fact that Wilson’s League
would be granted supervisory control over the mandate
system promised that Wilsonian progressivism would be
served regardless of French or British intentions.
In the end, the Wilsonian progressive vision was
inherent in the veiled imperialism contained in the mandate
system. Rhetoric aside, Wilson and House failed to embrace
the inherent geopolitical realities of a pluralist world.
As a result, they sanctioned a deeply flawed, racist system
of mandates favoring white, European political and cultural
dominance over indigenous peoples.
In this light, the genuine nature and intent of
Wilsonian philosophy is revealed. Wilson and House were not
truly concerned with fostering colonial independence in the
near future. Rather, they desired to build a new order,
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bestowing American cultural progressivism on colonial
peoples. While arguably different from traditional forms of
colonialism, such notions furnished merely a new framework
for imperialism, hidden behind idealistic rhetoric and
administered by the League of Nations for a progressive
future.
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